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Congress inevitably enacts ambiguous statutes1 and resolving this statutory 
uncertainty commonly falls to the courts or the relevant administrative agency.  
                                                 
 + Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law; J.D., Georgetown University; B.A, 
University of California, Los Angeles.  This Article benefitted from the thoughtful comments of 
Donald T. Bogan, Brian M. McCall, Emily H. Meazell, Joseph T. Thai, and the participants in a 
roundtable discussion at the University of Oklahoma. The author is responsible for any errors. 
 1. See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 127–29 (1998) (analyzing the 
various interpretations of the phrase “carries a firearm”); id. at 144 n.6 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
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But, between a court and an agency, which entity should be chiefly responsible 
for statutory interpretation?  In the landmark Chevron decision, the Supreme 
Court crafted a two-step inquiry for a court’s review of an agency’s statutory 
interpretation.2  The first step considers whether congressional intent is clear 
and, if it is, the agency and the court must interpret the statute consistent with 
the intent of Congress.3  If the statute is ambiguous, however, the second step 
requires the court to defer to the agency’s reasonable interpretation of the 
statute.4  The court must defer to the agency’s reasonable interpretation of the 
statute even if the court would have interpreted the ambiguity differently.5  
Although Chevron was groundbreaking in numerous fields, it merely reflected 
the existent standard operating procedure in the field of securities regulation.  
Before Chevron, courts routinely deferred to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”)—the agency Congress charged with 
administering federal securities laws.6  In particular, before Chevron, courts 
accorded great weight to the SEC’s interpretation of whether a financial 
                                                                                                                 
(“And in the television series M*A*S*H, Hawkeye Pierce (played by Alan Alda) presciently 
proclaims: ‘I will not carry a gun . . . .  I’ll carry your books, I’ll carry a torch, I’ll carry a tune, 
I’ll carry on, carry over, carry forward, Cary Grant, cash and carry, carry me back to Old 
Virginia, I’ll even ‘hari-kari’ if you show me how, but I will not carry a gun!’” (citation 
omitted)).  Additionally, Congress may intentionally enact ambiguous statutes.  See Joseph A. 
Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of 
Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 640 (2002) (suggesting 
that Congress might rationally choose to use ambiguous terms if intending to allow the courts to 
resolve disputes with flexible rather than stringent standards). 
 2. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984). 
 3. Id. at 842–43. 
 4. Id. at 843. 
 5. See id. at 843 n.11 (noting that a court should not apply its own interpretation of a 
statute, but must defer to an agency interpretation where it is reasonable). 
 6. See, e.g., SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819–20 (2002) (“[The SEC’s] interpretation 
of the ambiguous text of § 10(b), in the context of formal adjudication, is entitled to deference if 
it is reasonable . . . .” (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–30 & n.12 (2001))); 
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 673 (1997) (“[Section] 14(e)’s rulemaking authorization 
gives the Commission ‘latitude,’ even in the context of a term of art . . . [W]e owe the 
Commission’s judgment ‘more than mere deference or weight.’ . . . [W]e must accord the 
Commission’s assessment ‘controlling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly 
contrary to the statute.’” (second bracketing in original) (citations omitted)).  For examples of 
the powers that Congress delegated to the Commission, see infra Part II.A–B. 
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instrument constituted a “security,” 7  a term that Congress defined 
ambiguously.8 
Since Chevron, the Supreme Court has decided four definition-of-security 
cases.9  However, the Court referenced neither Chevron nor an alternative 
deferential standard in any of those cases.10  Additionally, none of the four 
cases discussed the appropriateness of deference to the Commission. 
The Court’s failure to accord explicit deference to the SEC in 
definition-of-security cases does not mean that it ultimately rejects the 
Commission’s position;11 rather, the SEC’s interpretations generally fare well 
                                                 
 7. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 (1979) 
(acknowledging that, although an agency’s interpretation is not controlling, “[i]t is a 
commonplace in our jurisprudence that an administrative agency’s consistent, longstanding 
interpretation of the statute under which it operates is entitled to considerable weight” (citing 
United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 719 (1975); Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 
65, 74 (1974); Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 626–27 (1971); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 
1, 16 (1965))). 
 8. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006) (defining the term by setting forth more than twenty 
instruments and including a circular definition: “The term ‘security’ means any . . . instrument 
commonly known as a ‘security’”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2006) (same); SEC v. 
Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 393 (2004) (“Congress . . . enacted a broad definition of ‘security,’ 
sufficient to ‘encompass virtually any instrument that might be sold as an investment.’” (quoting 
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990))); infra Part II.D. 
 9. See Edwards, 540 U.S. at 393; see also Reves, 494 U.S. at 61; Landreth Timber Co. v. 
Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 (1985); Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701, 704 (1985). 
 10. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 234 (“Chevron did nothing to eliminate Skidmore’s holding that 
an agency’s interpretation may merit some deference whatever its form, given the ‘specialized 
experience and broader investigations and information’ available to the agency, and given the 
value of uniformity in its administrative and judicial understandings of what a national law 
requires.” (citations omitted) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944))). 
 11. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 33, Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (No. 02-1196), 2003 WL 
21498455, at *15–16 & n.11 (seeking deference and referencing Chevron and Mead); Brief for 
SEC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9, Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) 
(No. 104), 1967 WL 113740, at *9 (seeking deference based upon “the Commission’s settled 
administrative interpretation” and its “repeated[] . . . determination[s] that such [instruments] are 
covered by the Act”); Brief for Petitioner at 37, SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) 
(No. 843), 1946 WL 50582 at *37 (seeking deference and citing Skidmore).  For examples of the 
Commission seeking deference outside of the definition-of-security setting, see Brief for 
Petitioner at 37–38, SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002) (No. 01-147), 2001 WL 1663770, at 
*34–39 (seeking deference and citing Chevron and Mead); and Brief for Petitioner at 36, United 
States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (No. 96-842), 1997 WL 86306, at *36 (seeking 
deference and citing Chevron). 
Although the Court’s recent silence regarding deference to the Commission differs from its 
pre-Chevron jurisprudence, the silence may be consistent with the Court’s recent unwillingness to 
apply Chevron to Chevron-eligible cases.  See 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE § 3.6 (4th ed. 2002) (“The Supreme Court has not shown comparable consistency and 
conscientiousness in applying Chevron. . . . Sometimes it gives Chevron powerful effect, 
sometimes it ignores Chevron, and sometimes it characterizes the Chevron test in strange and 
inconsistent ways.”); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of 
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to 
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008) (“[W]e found that the Court usually does not apply 
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before the Court.12  Recently, without explanation, the Court has seemingly 
deviated from its precedent favoring deference to the SEC’s interpretation of 
statutory ambiguity.13 
Some scholars have addressed the issue of court deference to an agency 
regarding the agency’s own jurisdiction, but in so doing, these scholars have 
made generalized arguments applicable to all agencies, typically failing to 
closely examine any single agency.14  This failure is significant because 
Congress empowered each agency differently and statutory evidence of the 
powers delegated to a particular agency informs the analysis of whether 
Congress granted that particular agency the authority to speak to its own 
jurisdiction.15  This Article takes a step towards filling this void, addressing 
an issue that has divided justices, courts, and scholars.16  The issue of 
deference to the SEC demands consideration as financial players innovate new 
financial products because the federal regulation of these products may hinge 
on the Commission’s determination of whether any such product constitutes a 
“security.” 
                                                                                                                 
Chevron to cases that are, according to Mead and other opinions, Chevron-eligible.”); infra Part 
I.A. 
 12. See Roberta S. Karmel, Creating Law at the Securities and Exchange Commission: The 
Lawyer as Prosecutor, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 39 (1998) (“From its formation in 1934 
until the mid-1970s, the SEC had a stellar record in the Supreme Court and the circuit courts, 
especially the Second Circuit, not only in cases where the SEC or the United States was the 
plaintiff, but also in cases where the SEC participated as amicus curiae.”). 
 13. See infra Part III.A–B.  Although this Article suggests the propriety of deference to the 
Commission regarding the definition of “security,” it does not address the degree of deference 
owed to the SEC, which may vary depending on circumstances.  See Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 
(“The fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute has been understood to 
vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the agency’s care, its 
consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency’s 
position.” (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted)); Eskridge & Baer, supra note 11, at 1158. 
 14. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. L REV. 2637, 2673–74 
(2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 236 (2006). 
 15. See infra Part II.A. 
 16. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 11, at 1130–32 (discussing the Court’s application of 
various deferential regimes to an agency’s interpretation of its own jurisdiction).  Compare 
Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 381 (1987) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (stating, “the rule of deference applies even to an agency’s interpretation of its own 
statutory authority or jurisdiction” (citations omitted)); and Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v. 
FERC, 569 F.3d 477, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“We afford Chevron deference to the Commission’s 
assertion of jurisdiction.”), and Sunstein, supra note 14, at 236 (“In the end, there is no sufficient 
basis for an exception to Chevron when jurisdictional issues are involved.”), with Miss. Power & 
Light Co., 487 U.S. at 387 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[A]gencies can claim no special expertise in 
interpreting a statute confining its jurisdiction.”), and NRDC v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179, 199 (2d 
Cir. 2004) (arguing that it is unlikely Congress would allow an agency the authority to decide the 
bounds of its own jurisdiction), and ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1567 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1987), 
and Garrett, supra note 14, at 2673–74 (asserting that “an independent judicial analysis to 
determine the scope of the delegation is vital to ensure that a relatively impartial entity determines 
the boundaries of agency authority”). 
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Part I of this Article discusses potential impediments to Chevron’s 
applicability to definition-of-security cases, contemplating the definition of 
“security” as a jurisdictional issue and discussing the applicability of Chevron 
to an agency’s determination of its own jurisdiction.  Part I then references 
Chevron’s emphasis on the political accountability of an executive agency and 
then examines the political accountability of the SEC, which is an independent 
commission.  Part I also addresses the applicability of a deferential regime to 
agency interpretations when private parties seek to enforce the federal 
securities laws.  Looking beyond the Commission’s general rule-making 
authority and its adjudicatory power, Part II examines evidence of 
congressional delegation of interpretive authority to the Commission regarding 
the definition of “security.”  Part II also discusses the SEC’s power to exempt 
“securities” from the reach of the federal securities laws, which amounts to the 
power to determine whether or not the federal securities laws should apply to a 
particular instrument.  Part III examines two recent definition-of-security 
cases in which the Supreme Court failed to defer to positions advanced by the 
Commission, and the negative consequences of the Court’s decisions.  
Finally, Part IV concludes that courts should defer to the Commission 
regarding its reasonable interpretations of “security.” 
I.  IMPEDIMENTS TO CHEVRON’S APPLICABILITY 
In the post-Chevron decision, SEC v. Edwards, the Court upheld 
unanimously the position of the SEC, based on decades of formal 
adjudications, that the disputed instrument constituted a “security.”17  In 
doing so, however, the Court did not reference the landmark Chevron decision.  
Richard Pierce, a scholar of administrative law, termed this omission “curious” 
and “strange.”18  Although Chevron deference may have been appropriate in 
Edwards, a court need not always apply Chevron deference to the SEC’s 
position regarding the definition of “security.”  Other cases may require a 
lesser degree of deference.19 
A.  Chevron’s Applicability to an Agency’s Determination of Its Jurisdiction 
When the Chevron Court introduced its method of judicial inquiry for 
analyzing an agency’s interpretation of statutory ambiguity, it discussed the 
appropriateness of deference to an agency entrusted by Congress to administer 
                                                 
 17. See SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 396 (2004) (citing decisions from 1939 to 1982). 
 18. PIERCE, supra note 11, § 3.6, at 175. 
 19. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (noting that measure of 
deference varies with the circumstances); see also, e.g., Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 
(2002) (applying Chevron deference because of “the interstitial nature of the legal question, the 
related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute, 
the complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has given the 
question over a long period of time”); Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 231 (noting that Chevron 
deference may be appropriate even absent administrative formality). 
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the statute.20  The classic agency domain is interstitial matters.21  According 
to the Court, the resolution of interstitial matters, which may require relevant 
expertise and likely involves policy choice, is better suited to a politically 
accountable expert (an agency) than a politically insulated non-expert (a 
court).22 
Scholars have noted that, in opinions following Chevron, where the facts 
suggested the appropriateness for Chevron’s application, the Court, without 
explanation, analyzed the issue without employing Chevron methodology.23  
The Court has yet to address specifically the applicability of Chevron to an 
agency’s interpretation of its own jurisdiction.24  Based on what the Court has 
said and left unsaid, some scholars have concluded that the Court first 
                                                 
 20. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (“Sometimes the 
legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit.  In 
such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a 
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.” (citing INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 
450 U.S. 138, 144 (1981); Train v. NRDC, 299 U.S. 232, 235–37 (1936))). 
 21. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974) (“The power of an administrative agency 
to administer a congressionally created and funded program necessarily requires . . . the making 
of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”).  In Chevron, the interstitial 
matters concerned the definition of “stationary source.”  See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 51.18(j)(1)(i) (1983)). 
 22. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (arguing that “[j]udges are not experts in the field”); id. at 
844 (“[T]he principle of deference to administrative interpretations has been consistently 
followed by this Court whenever decision as to the . . . reach of a statute has involved reconciling 
conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the given 
situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to 
agency regulations.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 23. See PIERCE, supra note 11, § 3.6, at 175 (noting that “sometimes [the Supreme Court] 
ignores Chevron”); see also Eskridge & Baer, supra note 11, at 1090 (“[W]e found that the Court 
usually does not apply Chevron to cases that are, according to Mead and other opinions, 
Chevron-eligible.”); Sunstein, supra note 14, at 239 (criticizing the Court’s after-the-fact 
reference to Chevron: “[a]fter parsing the statute independently, the Court turned to Chevron in a 
brief paragraph, noting (finally!)”). 
 24. See Garrett, supra note 14, at 2674; see also Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, 
Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 851 (2001).  In particular, the Court has not cited 
Chevron, or Mead or Skidmore, in any of its recent decisions regarding the definition of 
“security,” which definition, in part, defines the Commission’s jurisdiction.  See, e.g., SEC v. 
Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990); Landreth Timber 
Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985); Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701 (1985).  Only 
Edwards has hinted—without citation to Chevron, Mead, or Skidmore—at the Court’s possible 
deference to the Commission’s position.  See 540 U.S. at 396 (“[I]t is no surprise that the SEC 
has consistently taken the opposite position [of that advocated by the petitioner] . . . . It has done 
so in formal adjudications . . . and in enforcement actions . . . .”).  However, even then, the Court 
never used the term “deference” or any variation thereof and the hint followed the Court’s 
independent analysis. 
The Court has been invited to address an action by the Federal Communications Commission 
that might be considered jurisdictional, and it may resolve the issue during the 2012 Term.  See 
City of Arlington, TX v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.), cert. granted in part, 133 S. Ct. 524 
(2012). 
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determines whether Chevron even applies to the issue to be resolved—the 
so-called Chevron Step Zero. 25   Some argue that Chevron’s Step Zero 
analysis is appropriate when an agency’s jurisdiction is at issue.26 
There are several reasons why a court’s interpretation of an agency’s 
jurisdiction may be preferable to the agency’s determination of the same 
issue.27   When one turns from the resolution of an interstitial statutory 
ambiguity, for which Congress intended the administering agency to be 
interpreter-in-chief, to the resolution of an ambiguity regarding an agency’s 
jurisdiction, some contend that courts should not defer to the administering 
agency.28  Congress, it is argued, delegated to the agency the authority to 
interpret matters within its jurisdiction, but Congress did not, the argument 
                                                 
 25. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 24, at 873 (describing Step Zero as “the inquiry that 
courts should undertake before moving on to [S]tep [O]ne”).  Recall that Chevron introduced an 
analysis involving Steps One and Two: (1) Is the statute ambiguous?  (2) If so, did the agency 
reasonably interpret the ambiguity?  See supra text accompanying note 2. 
 26. See, e.g., Merrill & Hickman, supra note 24, at 912; Sunstein, supra note 14, at 234. 
 27. Although the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) arguably favors a court over an 
agency as the primary interpreter of an agency’s jurisdiction, others have found that the statute 
provides little resistance to court deference to the agency.  Congress emphasized jurisdictional 
limitations on agencies and also provided for court review under the APA.  See 5 U.S.C. § 
558(b) (2006) (“A [substantive rule or order] may not be . . . issued except within jurisdiction 
delegated to the agency and as authorized by law.”); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (“To the 
extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant 
questions of law . . . .”); id. § 706(2)(C) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set 
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . in excess of statutory jurisdiction, 
authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right . . . .”); 15 U.S.C. § 78y(b)(4) (2006) (stating 
that a court shall enforce a rule unless it is “in excess of statutory jurisdiction [or] authority”).  
Chevron itself contained no reference to these provisions nor did those justices who engaged in 
debate on this particular issue make any reference to them.  Compare Miss. Power & Light Co. 
v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 380–82 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (favoring 
deference to agency), with id. at 386–89 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (refusing to defer to the 
agency).  Moreover, “[i]n many statutes, Congress has not only enacted binding law, but has, 
consistent with the APA, delegated to agencies the authority to create binding ‘law,’ usually 
through formal adjudications and legislative rules.” Eskridge & Baer, supra note 11, at 1161 
(citing Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 HARV. L. REV. 239, 249–57 (1955)); 
see also John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 
199–200 (1998) (“The [EPA’s] rulemaking power reconciles the result in Chevron  with  the  
APA . . . . And  the  result  can  be  extended  to  .  .  .  administrative agencies [with] 
. . . blanket authorizations to promulgate rules . . . .”).  Congress also empowered the SEC with 
broad rulemaking authority.  See 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (2006) (“The Commission shall have 
authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as may be 
necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter . . . .”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) 
(2006) (“The Commission . . . shall . . . have power to make such rules and regulations as may be 
necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of this chapter for which [it is] responsible 
or for the execution of the functions vested in [it] by this chapter . . . .”); Duffy, supra, at 202 
(noting that a court may “find that the statute confers on the agency a lawmaking power”). 
 28. See Garrett, supra note 14, at 2674 (advising against Chevron deference for agency 
jurisdictional questions). 
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continues, delegate authority to the agency to interpret its own jurisdiction.29  
Rather, jurisdictional matters involve issues familiar to courts, and a court’s 
generalized legal expertise is sufficient.30 
The agency’s interpretation of its own jurisdiction might be viewed with 
skepticism.  Perhaps for reasons of hubris or self-aggrandizement, an agency 
may seek to expand its regulatory empire, an attempt that should not benefit 
from a reviewing court’s deference.31  Some evidence suggests that the SEC 
has attempted to expand its regulatory reach.32  For these reasons, among 
                                                 
 29. See Miss. Power & Light Co., 487 U.S. at 386 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Agencies do 
not ‘administer’ statutes confining the scope of their jurisdiction . . . .”); see also NRDC v. 
Abraham, 355 F.3d 179, 199 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that a “responsible Congress” would not give 
an agency the authority to determine its own jurisdiction); id. at 200 (applying “a lesser degree of 
deference than Chevron-level” to agency determination of its own jurisdiction when the statute is 
ambiguous). 
 30. See Miss. Power & Light Co., 487 U.S. at 387 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[A]gencies can 
claim no special expertise in interpreting a statute confining its jurisdiction.”); Ernest Gellhorn & 
Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 989, 1009 (1999) 
(stating that agencies are no better-equipped than the courts for interpreting statutes). 
 31. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 24, at 867 (noting that Chevron opens the potential 
for “agency aggrandizement . . . without any effective judicial check” (footnote omitted)).  Note 
that, if a court determines that the agency’s position should not be accorded deference, the court 
maintains or expands its own regulatory domain.  Nevertheless, the argument favoring 
regulatory expansionism by judges may be weaker than the argument favoring regulatory 
expansionism by agencies.  See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and 
the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 46 (2003) (“The judge writing an opinion will typically be limited 
in his involvement to the specific case and will not reap any benefits ex post from greater 
regulatory intervention.”).  But see Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 519, 541–42 & n.71 (2008) (noting the topical specialization by judges, including 
Judge Frank Easterbrook, who specializes in corporate law and federal securities regulation). 
One should also consider the possibility of an agency shirking its responsibility with regard to 
portions of its congressionally delegated domain, perhaps for reasons of agency capture.  See 
infra notes 126–29 and accompanying text.  But see Joel Seligman, Self-Funding for the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 NOVA L. REV. 233, 252 (2004) (“Few have seriously 
suggested that the SEC has been a ‘captive’ of the industries it regulates.”).  Arguably, an 
agency will seek to contract its regulatory empire to appease regulated entities, but a reviewing 
court should not defer to such an interpretation.  Even the unconscious bias of an administrator 
may lead to overreaching by an agency based on a misperception of the agency’s core 
competencies.  Some scholars, however, argue that “[n]o sustained evidence justifies the 
suggestion that when agencies make decisions on major questions, bias and self-interest are the 
motivating factors.”  Sunstein, supra note 14, at 233.  Even if agency leaders suffer cognitive 
biases, evidence suggests that judges also suffer from such biases.  See Chris Guthrie et al., 
Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 45 (2007) (noting that 
judges may be influenced by cognitive biases despite their awareness of them). 
 32. See, e.g., 2 LOUIS LOSS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 1209 (4th ed. 2007) 
(suggesting that the SEC “contends for a liberal application of this definition [of ‘security’]”); 
Dean Foust, Is Breeden Too Ambitious for the SEC’s Good?, BUSINESSWEEK, Feb. 10, 1992, at 
116 (criticizing the then-Chairman’s “aggressive campaigns to expand his agency’s power”); see 
also Karmel, supra note 12, at 38 n.27 (“A high ranking SEC enforcement official once told me 
he had no interest in leaving the Commission despite the financial rewards available in the private 
sector because ‘now, every CEO in America will take my phone call.’”); Aguilar Calls for 
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others, a court may owe no deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own 
jurisdiction.33 
However, the same arguments that support court deference to an agency’s 
interpretation regarding non-jurisdictional matters still support court deference 
to an agency’s interpretation of jurisdictional matters.34 
As a preliminary matter, an issue is not always easily categorized as 
jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional. 35   Every interpretation of a statute 
necessarily concerns that statute’s reach; thus, in a sense, every ambiguity 
presents a jurisdictional question.36  For example, this Article concerns the 
definition of “security” as a gateway issue to regulation by the SEC.  A broad 
definition of “security” expands the regulatory jurisdiction of the 
Commission.37  Nevertheless, the Court had at one time accorded the SEC 
deference on this issue.38  Notwithstanding the Court’s history of deference to 
the Commission regarding the definition of “security,” every statutory 
ambiguity becomes jurisdictional.39  Under section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), Congress prohibited certain behavior 
“in connection with” the purchase or sale of a security.40  If the disputed 
behavior is “in connection with” a securities transaction, then the SEC may 
regulate it, but if that behavior is not “in connection with” a securities 
transaction, then the Commission must find other authority to regulate.  Thus, 
the phrase “in connection with” defines the Commission’s jurisdiction under 
section 10(b).  Despite the jurisdictional nature of the phrase “in connection 
with,” and contrary to the Court’s recent definition-of-security cases, the Court 
                                                                                                                 
Enhanced SEC Enforcement, Including Authority to Bring Criminal Action, 41 Sec. Reg. & L. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 492 (March 23, 2009) (setting forth the Commission’s position that 
“Congress . . . expand the commission’s enforcement powers, including giving it the ‘standby 
authority’ to bring criminal charges in cases in which the Justice Department does not act”). 
 33. See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 234–35. 
 34. See Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 172–74 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(according Chevron deference to a Commission rule that narrowly defined a congressional 
exemption, which arguably expanded the Commission’s jurisdiction). 
 35. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 235. 
 36. See Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 281 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]here is no discernible line between an agency’s exceeding its 
authority and an agency’s exceeding authorized application of its authority.”); see also Einer 
Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2053–54 
(2002) (arguing that every question regarding an administrative statute implicates the scope of the 
administering agency’s jurisdiction); Garrett, supra note 14, at 2674 (acknowledging the 
difficulty in defining what constitutes a jurisdictional question). 
 37. See SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350 (1943) (noting that the term 
“security” “controls the scope of th[e] Act” (footnote omitted)); LOSS ET AL., supra note 32, at 
856 (“[T]he definition of security determines the reach of the federal securities laws.”). 
 38. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 39. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 40. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, ch. 404, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 
891 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (2006)). 
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accorded deference to the SEC’s interpretation of the ambiguous phrase.41  
Logically, if the Court should defer to the Commission regarding the meaning 
of “in connection with,” which defines the statute’s reach, the Court should 
also defer to the SEC regarding the meaning of “security” as long as the 
interpretation is reasonable. 
Court deference to the Commission may be critical to achieving a federal 
regulatory regime.  Under a non-deferential regime, courts would more likely 
reach different conclusions regarding statutory ambiguity.  Consequently, the 
SEC’s regulatory reach could differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, 
potentially giving rise to mischief.  For example, courts have differed 
regarding whether an instrument constitutes an “investment contract,” a term 
that is among the laundry list of instruments that Congress identified as 
“securities.”42  The SEC and the Court define “investment contract” as an 
instrument reflecting certain criteria, including a common enterprise.43  If 
there is no common enterprise, the instrument is not an “investment 
contract,”44 and thus not a “security” (unless the instrument meets the criteria 
of another item on Congress’s laundry list).45  It seems inapt to consider as 
jurisdictional the issue of common enterprise.  Arguably, a reviewing court 
should highly value the SEC’s insights regarding what constitutes a common 
enterprise.  Eschewing the Commission’s position, however, courts have 
become divided, with some circuits favoring “horizontal commonality,” which 
requires more than one investor, and other circuits favoring “vertical 
commonality,” the requirement of which may be met even if there is only one 
investor.46  Thus, the same instrument could qualify as a “security” in one 
circuit but not in a neighboring circuit, undermining the idea of federal 
regulation.47 
                                                 
 41. See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819–20 (2002) (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 
533 U.S. 218, 229–30 n.12 (2001)); see also United States v. Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305, 319 
(2009) (“This is the very situation in which we look to an authoritative agency for a decision 
about the statute’s scope, which is defined in cases at the statutory margin by the agency’s 
application of it, and once the choice is made we ask only whether the [agency]’s application was 
reasonable.”). 
 42. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006) (“The term ‘security’ means any . . . investment 
contract . . . .”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2006) (same). 
 43. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946) (defining “investment 
contract”). 
 44. See James D. Gordon III, Interplanetary Intelligence About Promissory Notes as 
Securities, 69 TEX. L. REV. 383, 396 (1990) (stating that the Howey test requires each prong, 
including “common enterprise,” to be met in order to establish an “investment contract”). 
 45. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10). 
 46. See LOSS ET AL., supra note 32, at 929–39 (outlining circuit approaches to “horizontal” 
and “vertical” commonality). 
 47. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the 
Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 
1093, 1121 (1987) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s “restricted capacity” to “give its own 
precise renditions of statutory meaning” inhibits uniformity). 
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Even if jurisdictional issues were always distinct from non-jurisdictional 
issues, it is not clear that a court should withhold deference to an agency’s 
interpretation of its own jurisdiction.  Just as considerations of expertise and 
political accountability favor court deference to an agency in non-jurisdictional 
matters, the same considerations favor deference in jurisdictional matters.48  
An agency’s intimate knowledge of the statute and the regulated/unregulated 
trade-offs provides a valuable background against which to determine the 
statute’s appropriate reach.49  As to congressional intent of the statute’s reach, 
the agency has an ongoing relationship with Congress—offering testimony and 
participating in the budgeting process—regarding the agency’s mission.  That 
relationship better enables the agency to determine its jurisdiction compared to 
the courts, which have fewer contacts with Congress and almost certainly no 
contacts with respect to the agency’s jurisdiction.50 
Moreover, Congress entrusted the SEC to make regulatory decisions 
involving policy trade-offs.51  Determining the appropriate reach of a statute 
amounts to a policy decision; this is true regarding the definition of 
“security.”52  Politically accountable agencies are better suited to make these 
policy determinations compared to a politically insulated court.53 
                                                 
 48. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 235–36. 
 49. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, 
Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1036, 1059 (2006) 
(“[S]tatutes that . . . address regulatory problems entailing significant risk-risk . . . tradeoffs may 
be more effective if their different provisions are interpreted in a way that reflects a coherent, 
consistent regulatory strategy, as conflicting interpretations create costs beyond those associated 
with the substantive resolution of each particular issue.  These conditions favor agency 
delegation.” (footnotes omitted)); CFTC’s Chilton Calls for Agency to Have Criminal 
Prosecution Authority, 77 U.S.L.W. 2491, 2491 (Feb. 17, 2009) (setting forth the commissioner’s 
argument that securities enforcement should be done by experts instead of “DOJ prosecutors who 
are more likely to be generalists, unfamiliar with the mechanics of derivatives trading and the 
interstices of the Act and regulations”). 
 50. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 602 (2009) (“Unlike 
courts, agencies have a continuous relationship with Congress and may have a better 
understanding of the general aims of legislation.” (footnote omitted)). 
 51. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2006) (“Whenever pursuant to this title the Commission is engaged 
in rulemaking and is required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection 
of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”). 
 52. See LOSS ET AL., supra note 32, at 856 (“[T]he definition of security determines the 
reach of the federal securities laws.  Thus, there is a policy dimension to how broadly or 
narrowly the term security is defined.”). 
 53. See Beck v. Dobrowski, 559 F.3d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 2009) (“It is a matter for the SEC to 
consider if it wants, because it involves a delicate tradeoff best confided to specialists in the 
securities markets.”); see also Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1398 (D.D.C. 1986) 
(per curiam) (“It is not as obvious today as it seemed in the 1930s that . . . the decisions of such 
agencies so clearly involve scientific judgement rather than political choice that it is even 
theoretically desirable to insulate them from the democratic process.”), aff’d sub nom. Bowsher v. 
Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Sunstein, supra note 14, at 243 (asserting that agencies are best 
suited to interpret ambiguous statutes due to their expertise and accountability). 
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Deference to an agency regarding its own jurisdiction likely would result in 
overlapping, or increasingly overlapping, regulation by multiple agencies.54  
Some commentators, including former high-ranking agency officials, typically 
disfavor having multiple regulators oversee portions of the whole, which is 
particularly true regarding the financial industry.55  Empowering courts with 
the ultimate authority to determine an agency’s jurisdiction, and to accord no 
particular weight to the agency’s position in making that determination, 
however, is no panacea.  Agencies will continue to overreach their statutory 
authority and battle over jurisdiction.56  In a non-deferential regime where 
agencies have no accountability for the determination of their jurisdiction, the 
agencies may adopt more aggressive positions.  The agencies could deflect 
jurisdictional criticism either to those who submit to the agency’s jurisdiction 
without challenge or to the courts that uphold or reject the agency’s aggressive 
position.57 
Generally, Congress will know of an agency’s tendency to overreach,58 and 
thus intentionally draft overlapping regulation on occasion.59  If overlapping 
                                                 
 54. See Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 386 (1988) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that deference should not be given to an agency when the 
statutory interpretation at issue involves that agency’s jurisdiction as well as the jurisdiction of 
other agencies); Chi. Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537, 539 (7th Cir. 1989).  Judge 
Easterbook stated that, “[i]f each agency’s interpretation of its own statute is entitled to some 
deference, then the [instrument] is both a security and a futures contract.  It has some attributes 
of both, and all attributes of neither, as we have laid out in excessive detail.  Neither 
characterization can be called wrong.”  Chi. Mercantile Exch., 883 F.2d at 548. 
 55. See Current, Former Officials Call for Streamlining of Financial Regulation, 41 Sec. 
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 567 (March 30, 2009) (arguing that “an ‘uber’ regulator 
responsible for securities, commodities, and insurance products” should take charge of the 
“piecemeal oversight” currently conducted by various agencies (quoting former SEC Chairman 
Harvey Pitt)); see also Randall Smith & Kara Scannell, Regulator Schapiro to Run SEC for 
Obama, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2008, at A15 (referencing the consolidation of the National 
Association of Securities Dealers and certain regulatory and enforcement functions of the New 
York Stock Exchange). 
 56. See Chi. Mercantile Exch., 883 F.2d at 544 (discussing the recurrence of jurisdictional 
disputes). 
 57. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 57 (1999) 
(“Legislators actually felt little responsibility to consider constitutional questions because they 
relied on the courts to bail them out [if they overreached].” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
To a certain extent, political accountability and subject matter expertise are inconsistent 
constructs because, if one simply does the bidding of the President, Congress, or the majority, 
then one may not have any incentive to attain the relevant expertise.  See Matthew C. 
Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53, 57–58 (2008). 
 58. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 
DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (suggesting that Congress is aware that statutory ambiguity will be resolved 
by agencies “whose policy biases will ordinarily be known”). 
 59. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 648–49 (1997) (discussing investigation by 
the SEC and eventual prosecution by the DOJ); see also H.R. REP. NO. 106-711, pt. 3, at 46–48 
(2000) (“Chairman Levitt of the SEC and Chairman Rainer of the CFTC noted that these products 
should be subject to joint regulation by both agencies.  The Committee agrees.”); Schapiro 
2013] Court Deference to the SEC 285 
regulation causes friction, 60  the President may be able to resolve these 
conflicts even if the concern involves independent agencies rather than 
executive agencies.61  Alternatively, the agencies may resolve their own 
disputes without intervention.62  Therefore, deference by a reviewing court to 
an agency’s interpretation of its own jurisdiction may not be a cause for 
concern. 
Significantly, the SEC’s participation in a jurisdictional squabble that 
potentially involves its own overreaching may be less troubling than similar 
squabbles involving other agencies because of the Commission’s broad 
exemptive powers.63  Consequently, if problems result from jurisdictional 
overreaching by the Commission, due to either redundant or unnecessary 
regulation, the SEC could exempt the “security” or “class of securities” from 
such regulatory provisions while continuing to fill regulatory gaps. 
B.  Sufficiency of the Commission’s Political Accountability64 
1.  Accountability to the President 
Because the Supreme Court has not addressed expressly the appropriate 
deference, if any, that a court should accord to the views of an independent 
                                                                                                                 
Encourages Lawmakers to Seek Legislation for Rating Liability, Proxy Access, 41 Sec. Reg. & L. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at 1345–46 (July 20, 2009) (discussing a White House legislative proposal 
that contemplates joint regulation of derivatives by the SEC and CFTC). 
 60. In certain circumstances, overlapping regulation could prove beneficial.  See, e.g., 
Daniel R. Fischel, Regulatory Conflict and Entry Regulation of New Futures Contracts, 59 J. 
BUS. S85, S101 (1986) (arguing that “[t]he best alternative to no entry regulation would be 
competition in entry regulation”). 
 61. See infra notes 95–99 and accompanying text. 
 62. See Joint Order Excluding Indexes Comprised of Certain Index Options from the 
Definition of Narrow-Based Security Index Pursuant to Section 1a(25)(b)(vi) of the Commodity 
Exchange Act and Section 3(a)(55)(c)(vi) of the Security Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-49469, 69 Fed. Reg. 16900, 16900–01 (Mar. 25, 2004); see also Chi. Mercantile 
Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537, 544 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that agencies cannot alter their 
jurisdiction by agreement when the alteration would clearly be contrary to the jurisdiction 
Congress defined); Joint Order Excluding from the Definition of Narrow-Based Security Index 
Those Security Indexes that Qualified for the Exclusion from that Definition Under Section 
1a(25)(b)(v) of the Commodity Exchange Act and Section 3(a)(55)(c)(v) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-46009, 67 Fed. Reg. 38941, 38941–42 
(May 31, 2002). 
 63. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-3; 78mm(a)(1) (2006); see also infra Part II.B. 
 64. The APA definition of “agency” includes independent commissions.  See 15 U.S.C.  
§ 551(1) (2006) (defining “‘agency’ [as] each authority of the Government of the United States”); 
see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 525 (2009) (plurality opinion) (“The 
Administrative  Procedure  Act  .  .  .  makes  no  distinction  between  independent  
and other agencies . . . in the standards for reviewing agency action.” (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 
701(b)(1), 706 (2006))).  Consequently, there may be no reason to treat judicial review of 
statutory interpretations by executive agencies differently than the statutory interpretations by 
independent agencies. 
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agency,65 Congress’s creation of the SEC as an independent agency, rather 
than an executive agency, is significant.66  For example, the Chevron Court 
deferred to an executive agency and, in crafting its analytical framework, it 
repeatedly referred to the importance of political accountability. 67   The 
Court’s emphasis on political accountability, and its express reference to the 
executive branch, has led some scholars to conclude that, although a reviewing 
court owes Chevron deference to an executive agency, courts need not accord 
such deference to an independent agency.68 
                                                 
 65. See Randolph J. May, Defining Deference Down: Independent Agencies and Chevron 
Deference, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 446 (2006) (“[I]t is somewhat surprising that the Court in 
Chevron did not then, nor has it since, said anything explicit about Chevron’s applicability to 
independent agencies.”).  Nevertheless, the Court has applied precedent involving executive 
agencies to cases involving independent agencies, and lower courts have applied Supreme Court 
precedent involving independent agencies to cases involving executive agencies.  See, e.g., 
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 534 (2002) (applying Chevron deference to the 
FCC); Matthew C. Stephenson, Mixed Signals: Reconsidering the Political Economy of Judicial 
Deference to Administrative Agencies, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 657, 697 & n.83 (2004) (collecting 
cases that apply “[l]egal principles and tests established in cases involving executive agencies [to] 
cases involving independent agencies, and vice versa”).  The Court may specifically address this 
gap in its jurisprudence during the 2012 Term.  See City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 668 F.3d 
229 (5th Cir.), cert. granted in part, 133 S. Ct. 524 (2012). 
 66. Some scholars suggest that Congress delegates to independent agencies when the 
opposing party occupies the White House, or at least when the President’s preferences do not 
align with those controlling Congress.  See DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF 
AGENCY DESIGN:  POLITICAL  INSULATION IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  GOVERNMENT  
BUREAUCRACY, 1946-1997, at 27–28 (2003); Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 
SUP. CT. REV. 41, 74.  But see id. at 73 (“The failure of Congress to demonstrate a consistent 
approach to agency independence is mirrored at the theoretical level by the absence of any 
noncircular explanation for why independence is needed in a particular case.”).  If true, then 
members of Congress seem short-sighted, because there is relatively rapid turnover in the White 
House.  See Richard A. Posner, Editorial, The Probability of Catastrophe . . ., WALL ST. J., Jan. 
4, 2005, at A12 (noting that “[p]oliticians [have] limited terms of office and thus foreshortened 
political horizons”).  Nonetheless, the argument seems misplaced with respect to the Securities 
Act and the Exchange Act, which were passed under President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) and 
both the House of Representatives and the Senate featuring large Democratic majorities.  It 
merits mention, however, that FDR later sought to bring independent agencies under presidential 
control.  See Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization 
and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 466–67 (2008) (discussing FDR’s 
view of independent agencies as the “headless fourth branch of government”). 
 67. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (referencing the 
“incumbent administration’s views of wise policy” and explaining that, “[w]hile agencies are not 
directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this 
political branch of the Government to make such policy choices”). 
 68. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2377 (2001) 
(“A Chevron-type doctrine attuned to the role of the President would respond to this disparity by 
giving greater deference to executive than to independent agencies.”); May, supra note 65, at 453 
(suggesting that “a reading of Chevron that accords less deference to independent agencies’ 
decisions than to those of executive branch agencies would be more consistent with our 
constitutional system and its values”). 
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Although a single administrator typically heads executive agencies, five 
commissioners head the SEC, with no more than three coming from a single 
political party. 69   The requisite bipartisan representation among SEC 
commissioners lessens the likelihood that the Commission would implement 
the President’s views.70  Even though both executive administrators and 
commissioners must be nominated by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate, 71  the President’s removal powers differ with respect to each.  
Generally, the President may remove an executive administrator with or 
without cause,72 but the President’s ability to remove a commissioner is 
limited to removal for cause,73 enhancing the commissioner’s independence 
and lessening accountability to the President.  Additionally, executive 
administrators generally resign at the end of a President’s term, increasing the 
likelihood that the political views of the next President and executive 
administrators coincide. 74   In contrast, Congress provided SEC 
commissioners with staggered, five-year terms so that some commissioners’ 
tenures will extend beyond the President’s term.75  These staggered terms 
reduce the likelihood that the views of a newly elected President coincide with 
each commissioner.  Moreover, commissioners—other than the 
chairperson—exhibit an unwillingness to resign upon the election of a 
president of a different political party.76 
Further, the SEC is relatively detached from the executive branch regarding 
its investigative and enforcement powers.  The Commission may commence 
investigations regarding violations of securities laws without consulting the 
executive branch.77  Upon determining that such violations have occurred or 
                                                 
 69. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006). 
 70. See Devins & Lewis, supra note 66, at 459 (noting the congressional intent to limit a 
President’s control of independent agencies). 
 71. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a). 
 72. See SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 855 F.2d 677, 682 (10th Cir. 1988) (applying 
limited president-removal powers to SEC commissioners (citing Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 602, 624–26 (1935))). 
 73. Removal by the President is likely limited to “for cause” situations.  See id.; see also 
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3148 (2010) (assuming 
that a commissioner may be removed only for cause); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689–93 
(1988) (upholding the statutory “good cause” limitation on the Attorney General’s power to 
remove independent counsel); Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 624–26 (limiting the President’s 
power to remove an FTC commissioner to those circumstances set forth by statute).  Congress, 
however, may be able to impeach commissioners.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 74. See Devins & Lewis, supra note 66, at 477. 
 75. Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (setting four-year term for the President), with 15 
U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006) (setting five-year, staggered terms for SEC commissioners). 
 76. See Devins & Lewis, supra note 66, at 490; see also SEC Historical Summary of 
Chairmen and Commissioners, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
http://sec.gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm (last updated Dec. 17, 2012). 
 77. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(1) (2006) (“The Commission may, in its discretion, make such 
investigations as it deems necessary to determine whether any person has violated, is violating, or 
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are imminent, the SEC may unilaterally seek injunctive relief as well as 
monetary penalties in federal district court.78  Additionally, the Commission 
may pursue administrative adjudication of securities law violations. 79  
Moreover, the SEC need not consult the executive branch when exercising its 
rulemaking authority80 or when opining on pending or proposed legislation.81 
The differences between an executive agency and an independent agency 
appear overstated; 82  the President may exert substantial influence over 
independent agencies.83  For example, although the President’s appointment 
and removal powers limit executive influence over the SEC, those limitations 
are exaggerated. 84   Though not required by statute, the Commission’s 
chairperson traditionally resigns upon a change in administrations, allowing 
                                                                                                                 
is about  to  violate  any  provision  of  this  chapter  [or]  the  rules  or  regulations 
thereunder . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 78. See 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2006) (“Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any 
person is engaged or about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a 
violation of the provisions of this subchapter, or of any rule or regulation prescribed under 
authority thereof, the Commission may in its discretion, bring an action in any district court of the 
United States . . . to enjoin such acts or practices . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also id. § 
77t(d)–(e), (g) (providing for monetary and non-monetary penalties); 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1) 
(mirroring 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b)); id. § 78u(d)(3) (providing for monetary penalties); Aulana L. 
Peters, Independent Agencies: Government’s Scourge or Salvation?, 1988 DUKE L.J. 286, 287 
(discussing the Commission’s independence). 
 79. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (2006); Peters, supra note 78, at 287 (noting the SEC’s ability to 
operate in a quasi-judicial capacity “without the advice or approval of either the executive or 
legislative branch”); Glen O. Robinson, Independent Agencies: Form and Substance in Executive 
Prerogative, 1988 DUKE L.J. 238, 242 (“Adjudications are insulated from influences outside the 
hearing process by constitutional and statutory norms of due process that bind the President no 
less than the ordinary citizen.”). 
 80. See Geoffrey P. Miller, The Debate over Independent Agencies in Light of Empirical 
Evidence, 1988 DUKE L.J. 215, 219 (stating that “[a]s to rulemaking and enforcement, the 
President has no authority to influence any agency, executive or independent, to act contrary to its 
statutory mandate”).  Congress granted the Commission both targeted and generalized 
rulemaking authority.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(b), 78j, 78n(a) (2006) (targeted authority); see also 
15 U.S.C. §§ 77s(a), 78w(a)(1) (2006) (generalized authority). 
 81. See 12 U.S.C. § 250 (2006) (“No officer or agency of the United States shall have any 
authority to require the Securities and Exchange Commission . . . to submit legislative 
recommendations, or testimony, or comments on legislation, to any officer or agency of the 
United States for approval, comments, or review, prior to the submission of such 
recommendations, testimony, or comments to the Congress if such recommendations, testimony, 
or comments to the Congress include a statement indicating that the views expressed therein are 
those of the agency submitting them and do not necessarily represent the views of the 
President.”). 
 82. See Miller, supra note 80, at 218 (noting this exaggeration (citing Susan Bartlett Foote, 
Independent Agencies Under Attack: A Skeptical View of the Importance of the Debate, 1988 
DUKE L.J. 223, 232–33)). 
 83. See Miller, supra note 66, at 43 (noting that some independent agencies are subject to 
more executive branch control than some executive agencies). 
 84. See Seligman, supra note 31, at 239 (providing, as an example, that President Clinton’s 
SEC appointments were largely based on political rationale rather than one’s qualifications). 
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the newly elected President to influence the Commission’s direction.85  Even 
though the chairperson is only one of five commissioners, he or she wields the 
power to control the agenda, 86  potentially influencing outcomes. 87  
Moreover, the chairperson controls the SEC’s purse, allocates business among 
the Commission’s administrative units, and appoints the heads of those 
administrative units.88   Although the President may not have significant 
influence over the commissioners regarding the SEC’s policies after their 
confirmation by the Senate, the power of appointment should not be 
underestimated as an executive means of guiding the Commission’s 
direction.89 
Cross-party resignations may not occur following a change in 
administrations, but the SEC’s positions, over time, closely align with those of 
the President.90  Furthermore, the difference in independence between an 
individual administrator and a multi-member commission may be exaggerated 
because of the significant role played by career-line officers, whose influences 
                                                 
 85. See Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, 15 Fed. Reg. 3175, 3175 (May 25, 1950), 
reprinted in 64 Stat. 1265 (1950) (“The functions of the Commission with respect to choosing a 
Chairman from among the commissioners composing the Commission are hereby transferred to 
the President.”); see also Peters, supra note 78, at 288 n.6 (“Upon a change in administration, the 
Chairman of the SEC is expected to tender his resignation to the new President.”); SEC Chairman 
Cox Resigns as SEC Chairman, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 20, 2009, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/20/chris-cox-resigns-as-sec-_n_159548.html (noting that 
the chairman’s resignation coincides with the inauguration of a President from a different party). 
 86. See Foust, supra note 32, at 115 (“In his two years as chairman of the Securities & 
Exchange Commission, Breeden has broadened the agency’s enforcement agenda and pushed a 
flurry of tough new regulations.”); see also Miller, supra note 66, at 80 & n.146 (“[T]he chairman 
of an independent agency is in theory only first among equals. . . . Agency chairmen, however, do 
often enjoy considerably greater powers because of their prestige in Congress, their access to the 
press, and their control over internal housekeeping matters such as staffing or budget.”); Peters, 
supra note 78, at 288 (noting that the chairperson has “general control of the Commission’s 
calendar”).  But see Karmel, supra note 11, at 41 (identifying a period at the SEC during which 
“the Enforcement Division dominated the Commission and to a significant extent set its agenda”). 
 87. See Michael E. Levine & Charles R. Plott, Agenda Influence and Its Implications, 63 
VA. L. REV. 561, 564–65 (1977) (arguing that agenda influences outcomes); see also Christopher 
Long & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Winning the Contest by Agenda Manipulation, 2 J. POL’Y 
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 123, 124–25 (1982) (same).  For example, former SEC Chairman Breeden 
was accused of refusing to process a matter on which a retiring commissioner had provided the 
swing vote, so as to nullify that critical vote in hopes of achieving a different outcome with a 
newly confirmed commissioner.  See Foust, supra note 32, at 116. 
 88. See Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, 15 Fed. Reg. at 3175. 
 89. See Peters, supra note 78, at 288 (discussing President Reagan’s implementation of a 
deregulatory scheme by his appointment of like-minded commissioners); see also Robinson, 
supra note 79, at 245 (asserting that “implicit in the selection itself is the choice of persons who 
will continue to be responsive to future presidential preferences”). 
 90. See Devins & Lewis, supra note 66, at 492. 
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have shaped the SEC’s policies.91  The far-reaching knowledge base, the 
practical experience, and the intimate familiarity of the relevant facts of career 
line-officers frequently enable them to successfully advocate positions that are 
accepted by the ultimate authority—whether an administrator or a 
multi-member commission—commonly without modification.92 
The independence of the SEC from the executive branch may also be 
overstated with respect to its investigative and enforcement powers.  
Although the SEC is not required to consult with the executive branch before 
or regarding an investigation, the Commission may voluntarily consult with 
executive branch representatives to preserve limited resources or coordinate 
across agencies.93  Because the Commission lacks criminal authority, it refers 
particularly egregious violations of the federal securities laws to the Attorney 
                                                 
 91. See Karmel, supra note 12, at 38 (emphasizing the enforcement staffs’ role in shaping 
the Commission’s policies); see also Miller, supra note 66, at 80 (“The expertise that makes a 
difference in particular cases will be concentrated in the career staff of an agency . . . .”). 
 92. See Karmel, supra note 12, at 41 (“[T]he staff controls the factual record which is 
presented to the Commission.” (footnote omitted)); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Organized 
Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (And Cause 
Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 121 (1997) (arguing that “[t]he employees with the 
most immediate access to basic information are almost always line personnel”); James G. March  
& Martha S. Feldman, Information in Organizations as Signal and Symbol, 26 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 
171, 176 (1981) (stating that “[o]ften, information is produced in order to persuade someone”); 
Miller, supra note 66, at 80 (“[T]he recommendations of the career officer will be reviewed by 
‘policy-making’ officials higher up in the chain of authority.  And in the vast majority of cases, 
in both independent and executive agencies, the staff recommendations are accepted by the 
agency heads without change.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1175, 1188 (1997) (“Often people make probability judgments on the basis of an initial 
value, or ‘anchor,’ from which they make insufficient adjustments.  The initial value may have 
an arbitrary or irrational source.” (footnote omitted)). 
 93. See Exec. Order No. 13,271, 3 C.F.R. 245 (2003) (creating an inter-agency working 
group composed  of  executive  and  independent  agencies);  see  also  OFFICE  OF  
CHIEF COUNSEL, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 108 
(2008) (discussing the Commission’s “[c]ooperation and coordination with other law enforcement 
agencies”); id. at 110 (“[The Commission] staff is encouraged to work cooperatively with 
criminal authorities, to share information, and to coordinate their investigations with parallel 
criminal investigations when appropriate.”); Andre Hruska, The President’s Corporate Fraud 
Task Force, U.S. ATT’YS’ BULL., May 2003, at 1, 2 (“[M]embers of the interagency group 
communicate frequently outside of the Task Force meetings on policy and, where appropriate, 
operational matters as they arise.”). 
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General for prosecution.94  After doing so, the SEC occasionally details 
members of its staff to assist in the prosecution of the referred cases.95 
Despite the independence of litigation in the lower courts, the Commission 
loses independence and influence when a matter reaches the Supreme Court, 
where the executive branch has the final say as to the government’s position.96  
Commonly, the SEC and the executive branch agree regarding the appropriate 
resolution of the issue presented,97 but, on those occasions of disagreement, 
the executive branch presents the government’s position to the Court. 98  
Additionally, the influence of the executive branch is not limited to silencing 
the Commission.  For purposes of briefing and argument before the Court, the 
executive branch, on at least one occasion, required the SEC to reverse its own 
previously articulated position before the lower courts.99 
                                                 
 94. See 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2006) (“The Commission may transmit such evidence as may be 
available concerning such acts or practices to the Attorney General who may, in his discretion, 
institute  the  necessary  criminal  proceedings  under  this subchapter.”);  see  also  15 
U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1) (2006) (virtually identical); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Charges 
Ex-Worldcom CEO Bernard Ebbers; Former Worldcom CFO Scott Sullivan Pleads Guilty (Mar. 
24, 2004) (announcing the indictment and guilty plea of corporate fraudsters and thanking the 
Commission for its assistance in the investigation), available at https://www2.fbi.gov/dojpressrel 
/pressrel04/world030204.htm. 
 95. See 28 U.S.C. § 543 (2006) (empowering the U.S. Attorney to appoint attorneys to assist 
AUSAs); see also, e.g., United States v. Wencke, 604 F.2d 607, 610 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); 
Wall v. United States, 384 F.2d 758, 763 (10th Cir. 1967). 
 96. Securities and Exchange Commission Historical Society Fireside Chat–Courts and the 
SEC (Apr. 17, 2007) (statement of Paul Gonson, former Solicitor, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n) 
[hereinafter Fireside Chat], transcript available at http://c0403731.cdn.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud 
.com/collection/programs/Transcrip_2007_0417_FC.pdf. 
 97. Id. (“Generally, the Solicitor General will defer to the SEC with regard to the position 
and the Solicitor General’s staff will do some editing of the brief [originally drafted by the 
SEC].”).  As evidence of an agreement, the DOJ and SEC generally file a joint merits brief with 
the Supreme Court.  See, e.g., Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 
1, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007) (06-484), 2007 WL 460606; 
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S 71 (2006) (No. 04-1371), 2005 WL 3048038; Brief for 
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1, Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 
U.S. 336 (2005) (No. 03-932), 2004 WL 2069564; Brief of Petitioner at 1, SEC v. Edwards, 540 
U.S. 389 (2004) (No. 02-1196), 2003 WL 21498455; Brief of Petitioner at 1, SEC v. Zandford, 
535 U.S. 813 (2002) (No. 01-147), 2001 WL 1663770. 
 98. See Linda Greenhouse, Skeptically, Court Hears Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 
2007, at C1, C11( “While the S.E.C. is an independent agency, it needs authorization from the 
solicitor general to file a Supreme Court brief.”).  Greenhouse refers to the Stoneridge case, in 
which the Commission supported a position advocated by plaintiffs, but the Bush Administration 
advocated a position favoring defendants before the Court.  See id. 
 99. See Fireside Chat, supra note 96 (“PAUL GONSON: . . . In the lower courts, the courts 
of appeals, the SEC and the FDIC had taken opposite positions on [whether the instrument was a 
‘security’].  One of these cases, the Marine Bank case, came to the Supreme Court.  The 
Solicitor General then invited the general counsels of the SEC and the three banking regulators to 
a suite in his office, locked the door, and said you guys aren’t coming out until you agree on a 
common position that you’ll all sign in the Supreme Court.”).  Little consolation flows from the 
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Congressional enactments may provide statutory cover, but the Commission 
does not insulate itself from the influence of the executive branch with respect 
to its rulemaking authority.100  In fact, the SEC has worked repeatedly with 
executive agencies in this regard. 101   After the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Commission worked with the Treasury 
Department in crafting new rules.102  Following Black Monday—the stock 
market break of October 1987—as the SEC prepared to propose legislation, 
President Ronald Reagan issued an executive order that created a working 
group composed of executive administrators and independent commissioners, 
which effectively prevented the Commission from taking action independently 
until the group had issued a report to him.103 
Finally, the President proposes the budget for agencies, including the SEC’s 
allocation thereof.  Thus, the Commission must, to a certain extent, appease 
the President in its actions lest it risk being short-changed.104  Even if an 
executive administrator is more responsive than a commission to the President, 
it need not be the case that courts can avoid Chevron deference to the views of 
an independent agency.  Even those who oppose a court’s application of 
Chevron to independent agencies concede that some lesser deference may be 
appropriate.105 
                                                                                                                 
fact that the Commission extracted from the DOJ footnotes that limited the arguments presented.  
See id. 
 100. See Peters, supra note 78, at 287 (“[A]s a matter of prudence and courtesy the 
Commission does consult with other agencies of government in formulating major legislative 
positions.”); see also Foust, supra note 32, at 116 (describing Chairman Breeden’s “efforts to 
ingratiate himself with the White House” by “shift[ing] course, or at least his emphasis, on 
several key policy issues to promote the Bush Administration agenda during an election year”); 
Colleen M. Kelley, Letter to the Editor, Don’t Blame the SEC’s Employees, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 
2009, at A12 (“[F]ront-line employees . . . have been hampered from fulfilling the [SEC’s] 
mission[] by leaders under the previous administration who were, at best, ambivalent about 
agency missions.”). 
 101. See Peters, supra note 78, at 287 (noting that the SEC works with other agencies). 
 102. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1749, 1807–08 (2007). 
 103. See Exec. Order No. 12,631, 3 C.F.R. 559 (1989); see also Jerry W. Markham & Rita 
McCloy Stephanz, The Stock Market Crash of 1987—The United States Looks at New 
Recommendations, 76 GEO. L.J. 1993, 2028 n.227 (1988) (“The agencies did not introduce 
proposals partly because they were awaiting the formation of the Presidential Working Group.”); 
Peters, supra note 78, at 293 (stating that Executive Order 12,631 temporarily “enjoined” the 
Commission). 
 104. Seligman, supra note 31, at 253 (“The SEC . . . submits its budget to the White House 
Office of Management and Budget, which consolidates several agency budgets into a single 
request.”). 
 105. See Kagan, supra note 68, at 2377 n.506 (arguing that the “adoption of the proposal 
offered here need not entail the elimination of all deference to independent agencies”). 
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2.  Accountability to Congress 
In Chevron, the Court partially justified ceding interpretive authority to an 
administrative agency because such agencies have greater political 
accountability than federal courts. 106   Although the Chevron Court 
specifically referenced executive agencies, which are accountable to the 
President, who, in turn, is accountable to the country,107 the Chevron Court did 
not discuss whether the requisite political accountability might come from 
congressional—rather than presidential—oversight. 108   Even if they are 
independent of the executive, independent agencies nevertheless may be 
sufficiently politically accountable to Congress so as to warrant deference from 
reviewing courts regarding interpretations of the ambiguous statutes that they 
administer.109  Accountability may arise through Congress’s confirmation 
power, power of the purse, and power to compel testimony, as well as through 
Congress’s ultimate legislative authority.110 
Through its confirmation power, Congress plays an influential role in the 
SEC’s composition because the Senate offers advice to the President regarding 
                                                 
 106. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984). 
 107. See id. at 865 (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief 
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make 
such policy choices . . . .”). 
 108. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 523 (2009) (plurality opinion) 
(“The independent agencies are sheltered not from politics but from the President, and it has often 
been observed that their freedom from presidential oversight (and protection) has simply been 
replaced by increased subservience to congressional direction.” (citations omitted)); see also id. at 
525 (“The Administrative Procedure Act, which provides judicial review, makes no distinction 
between independent and other agencies, neither in its definition of agency, nor in the standards 
for reviewing agency action.” (citations omitted)). 
 109. See WILLIAM L. CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES 4 (1967) 
(“Government regulatory commissions are often referred to as ‘independent’ agencies, but this 
cannot be taken at face value by anyone who has ever had any experience in Washington.  In 
fact, government regulatory agencies are stepchildren whose custody is contested by both 
Congress and the Executive, but without very much affection from either one.”); see also 
Bressman, supra note 102, at 1806 (“[T]he Court may ensure that Congress can use 
administrative procedures to control independent agencies.”); Karmel, supra note 12, at 43 (“At 
least while I was a Commissioner, the SEC did not consider itself as independent of congress as it 
did of the White House.”); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the 
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 100 (1994) (“It is not as obvious today as it seemed in the 
1930s that there can be such things as genuinely ‘independent’ regulatory agencies, bodies of 
impartial experts whose independence from the President does not entail correspondingly greater 
dependence upon the committees of Congress to which they are then immediately accountable . . . 
.”); Miller, supra note 80, at 218 (noting that “studies . . . suggest that independent agencies may 
be somewhat more responsive to Congress”). 
 110. See  Fox,  556 U.S. at 525 n.5 (noting the “extrastatutory  influence  Congress  
exerts  over agencies . . . which is exerted by the congressional committees responsible for 
oversight and appropriations with respect to the relevant agency”); see also Scalia, supra note 58, 
at 518 (“Under Chevron, . . . [a statutory ambiguity] can mean a range of things, and it is up to the 
agency, in light of . . . political pressures that it feels from Congress . . . to specify the correct 
meaning.”). 
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nominees, and no nominee can become a commissioner without the Senate’s 
consent.111  Recent Presidents have given surprising import to the “advice” of 
Senate leaders of the rival party in nominating minority positions on the 
Commission.112  During the confirmation process, the Senate may “exact 
promises from nominee[s],”113 increasing the likelihood that a nominee’s 
regulatory vision adequately aligns with that of a majority of senators.  
Although Congress empowered the chairperson to appoint directors of the 
Commission’s various divisions,114 Congress may lean on the chairperson to 
influence those appointments.115 
The SEC responds to congressional influence because Congress controls the 
purse.116   The Commission is one of the few agencies whose revenues 
historically have exceeded its expenses, but it does not retain the revenue that 
it collects.117  The revenue goes to the federal fisc, and the SEC must 
convince Congress to allocate to it enough money to cover its expenses.118  
                                                 
 111. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, ch. 404, § 4(a), 48 Stat. 881, 885 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006)). 
 112. See Seligman, supra note 31, at 257 (stating that recently “Senate leaders of the leading 
other political party have proposed the minority of the commissioners representing the rival 
political party”). 
 113. Peters, supra note 78, at 288. 
 114. See Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, 15 Fed. Reg. 3175, 3175 (May 25, 1950), 
reprinted in 64 Stat. 1265 (1950). 
 115. See Enforcement Chief Thomsen Leaving SEC; Deutsche Bank Lawyer Seen as 
Successor, 41 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 7. at 246 (Feb. 16, 2009) (“[G]iven the anger of 
many in Congress at the enforcement program, and criticisms, however unfair, from many 
quarters including the Commission’s own inspector general, [Chairperson] Mary Schapiro has to 
make a visible change in the leadership and direction of the division or lose her own credibility 
with Congress.” (quoting an unnamed securities attorney)); see also Gretchen Morgenson, Top 
Enforcer at the S.E.C. Steps Down, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2009, at B1 (discussing the new 
Chairperson’s acceptance of the Director of Enforcement’s resignation “amid blistering criticism 
that the commission had failed to protect investors in recent years”). 
 116. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 
502, 525 n.5 (2009) (plurality opinion) (noting the “extrastatutory influence Congress exerts over 
agencies . . . which is exerted by the congressional committees responsible for . . . appropriations 
with respect to the relevant agency”); Seligman, supra note 31, at 234 (“Congress generally 
prefers control of budgetary purse strings as a technique to control how the independent 
regulatory agencies function.”). 
 117. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77f(b), 78ee (2006); see also Financial Services and General 
Government Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1997: Hearing on H.R. 3814 Before a Subcomm. of 
the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 104th Cong. 704, 713 (1996) (statement of Arthur Levitt, 
Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n) (“[T]he SEC has been a net contributor to the U.S. 
Treasury, collecting more in fees than was necessary to cover its budget in every year since 
1983.”); Peters, supra note 78, at 294; Seligman, supra note 31, at 239 (reporting that the fees 
collected by the Commission in 1993 were twice the funds allocated by Congress and that in 2001 
its fee collections were more than five times the amount appropriated to it). 
 118. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in 
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .”); see also Fiscal 2009 Appropriations: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Services and General Government of the S. Comm. 
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Consequently, Congress employs the budgetary process to ensure that the 
Commission is fulfilling its congressional mission.119  By shortening the 
period during which Congress budgets funds to the SEC, Congress has 
enhanced the effectiveness of this monitoring mechanism and increased the 
Commission’s accountability.120 
In addition to addressing budgetary matters, representatives of the 
SEC—typically the chairperson and division directors—testify frequently 
before Congress regarding regulatory shortcomings and potential remedies 
thereof.121  Congress continually monitors the Commission, even if such 
monitoring varies in intensity over time—arguably less intense during market 
booms and more intense during market busts.122 
As is typical following a market drop, previously undiscovered frauds are 
illuminated.  For example, following the precipitous market drop in late 2008, 
Congress convened several hearings during which representatives of the SEC 
appeared, with members of Congress lambasting the Commission for 
shortcomings in its enforcement.123  Of particular note was the $50 billion 
fraud perpetrated by Bernard Madoff that ensnared the likes of Elie Wiesel, 
                                                                                                                 
on Appropriations, 110th Cong. 349–52 (2008) (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n). 
As a caveat, recently Congress authorized the use of disgorgement funds, such that certain 
fines previously collected by the Commission (and paid to the federal fisc) may be paid to 
disgorgement funds to remedy harms suffered by investors.  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 308, 116 Stat. 745, 784–85 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7201 
(2006)). 
 119. See Karmel, supra note 12, at 43 (“Members of Congress who head up oversight 
committees can cause an agency like the SEC a great deal of aggravation or can benefit the 
agency through budgetary largess . . . .”); see also Peters, supra note 78, at 294 (“It is neither 
unusual nor inappropriate for Congress to use the budget process to ensure that an agency is 
fulfilling its statutory mandate.”). 
 120. Compare S. REP. NO. 100-105, at 2 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2087, 2090 
(describing the necessity of legislation and stating that “the expanding responsibilities and 
workload of the Commission as well as recurring revelations of improprieties in the financial 
markets cast doubt on the wisdom of making a 3 year appropriation in today’s environment.  
The Subcommittee believes that it should have greater involvement in overseeing the SEC’s 
operations . . . . Accordingly, the Subcommittee believes a 2 year authorization is appropriate.”), 
with supra note 118 (noting the chairman’s annual appearances before congressional 
appropriations subcommittees). 
 121. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. at 523–24 & n.4; see also SEC 
Congressional Testimony, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://sec.gov/news/testimony.shtml (last 
modified Dec. 12, 2012) (archiving prepared testimony before Congress by representatives of the 
Commission from 1995 to present). 
 122. See Karmel, supra note 12, at 43 (noting Congress’s use of appropriations as a means of 
oversight that fluctuates over time). 
 123. See More Effective SEC Changes Recommended by Commerce, 24 CORP. COUNS. 
WKLY. 52, 53 (2009) (“The SEC’s belated discovery of Bernard Madoff’s alleged Ponzi scheme 
has prompted lawmakers, in three hearings since January, to focus on the Division of 
Enforcement’s handling of complaints and sharing of information among themselves, with the 
commission, and with other regulators.”). 
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Steven Spielberg, and John Malkovich. 124   After a hearing in which 
“[s]ecurities regulators could not cool the white-hot Congressional fury” 
regarding the Commission’s “failure to act on tips that might have exposed the 
Madoff scandal,” Chairwoman Mary L. Schapiro requested a meeting with the 
House Financial Services subcommittee to “work out ‘a course forward’ that 
would provide accountability and maintain the integrity of continuing 
investigations.” 125   Two days later, Shapiro convened meetings with 
commissioners and senior SEC staff to “reinvigorate the SEC’s enforcement 
program, including improving the handling of tips and whistleblower 
complaints . . . .”126  Less than two weeks after Congress excoriated the 
Commission for its decades-long failure to pursue allegations of the Madoff 
fraud, the Commission followed up on another case with a history of fraud 
allegations by charging R. Allen Stanford and affiliates with financial fraud.127 
Congress’s influence over the Commission is not limited to enforcement 
matters.  Because Congress can revise, supplement, or reverse any 
administrative rule,128 the Commission remains accountable to Congress when 
it acts in a quasi-legislative capacity.129  Congress monitors the SEC130 and 
may either impede the Commission’s rulemaking or induce the Commission to 
                                                 
 124. See id.; see also Richard Hill & Yin Wilczek, Enforcement Chief Thomsen Leaving 
SEC: Beutsche Bank Lawyer Seen as Successor, in 41 SECURITIES REGULATION & LAW 245, 245 
(BNA, Feb. 16, 2009) (reporting Madoff’s confession to senior Commission staffers that his 
investment business was actually a Ponzi scheme); Lynnley Browning, Madoff Victims Will Get a 
Tax Break, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009, at B3 (identifying some of Madoff’s victims). 
 125. Diana B. Henriques, At Madoff Hearing, Lawmakers Lay into S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
5, 2009, at B1, B10. 
 126. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address to Practising Law 
Institute’s “SEC Speaks in 2009” Program (Feb. 6, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/s 
peech/2009/spch020609mls.htm. 
 127. See Glenn R. Simpson et al., Madoff Case Led SEC to Intensify Stanford Probe, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 19, 2009, at A14; see also Karmel, supra note 12, at 43 (“While the Enforcement 
Division probably would not quash an investigation because of congressional pressure, the staff 
can and does begin and pursue investigations because of it.”). 
 128. See U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2. 
 129. Even though Congress has authority to revise, supplement, or reverse an administrative 
rule, it may choose not to invoke that authority.  Congress’s legislative attention is focused on 
many matters outside the realm of the securities laws.  See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.  
Additionally, Congress has impediments to enacting legislation.  See, e.g., McNollgast, Positive 
Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 720 
(1992) (noting that “to succeed, a bill must survive a gauntlet of veto gates”).  Congress only 
periodically passes new securities legislation, see Seligman, supra note 31, at 251, but 
periodically does not mean never.  See LOSS ET AL., supra note 32, at 1103 (discussing 
congressional amendment to definition of “security”). 
 130. See Bressman, supra note 50, at 603 (“Congress maintain[s] active interest in agency 
decision making as it unfolds.” (citing Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in 
Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1804–13 (2007))). 
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promulgate rules.131  The SEC is sufficiently accountable to Congress to merit 
court deference.132  Albeit infrequently and without explication, the Court has 
relied on the Chevron framework when deciding cases involving an 
independent agency.133 
C.  Public Versus Private Enforcement 
The Supreme Court commonly favors SEC interpretations when the agency 
is enforcing federal securities laws,134 but the Commission’s positions in 
private securities litigation do not fare as well before the Court.135  Some 
scholars suggest that, when private parties litigate, the Commission is neither 
acting in its enforcement nor its rulemaking capacity and, thus, its position 
commands no deference from a reviewing court, 136  whereas the SEC’s 
                                                 
 131. See SEC Regulatory Accountability Act, H.R. 2308, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011) (requiring 
clear identification of the problem to be addressed by the Commission’s regulation as well as 
clear articulation of the costs and benefits of that regulation); see also Peters, supra note 78, at 
294 (criticizing Congress’s attempts to impede the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering Analysis and 
Retrieval (EDGAR) initiative by “impos[ing] significant restrictions on the Commission’s ability 
to finance the system . . . [and also] impos[ing] time-consuming reporting and certification 
requirements”); Seligman, supra note 31, at 242–43 (describing Congress’s deregulatory bent and 
stating that the “Commission would have to backpedal by administrative action to reduce the 
likelihood of more deregulatory legislation”). 
 132. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 523 (2009) (plurality opinion) 
(stating that “independent agencies are sheltered not from politics but from the President, and it 
has often been observed that their freedom from presidential oversight (and protection) has 
simply been replaced by increased subservience to congressional direction” and also noting that 
“[t]he Administrative Procedure Act, which provides judicial review, makes no distinction 
between independent and other agencies, neither in its definition of agency, nor in the standards 
for reviewing agency action.” (citations omitted)). 
 133. See, e.g., id. at 525; Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 501–02 (2002). 
 134. See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819–20 (2002) (“[The Commission’s] 
interpretation of the ambiguous text of § 10(b), in the context of formal adjudication, is entitled to 
deference if it is reasonable” (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–30 & n.12 
(2001))); see also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 673 (1997) (“Because Congress has 
authorized the Commission, in § 14(e), to prescribe legislative rules, we owe the Commission’s 
judgment ‘more than mere deference or weight.’ . . . [W]e must accord the Commission’s 
assessment ‘controlling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to 
statute.’” (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 
416, 424–26 (1977); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984))). 
 135. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 (1979) (collecting cases in 
which the Supreme Court has refused to apply the SEC’s statutory interpretations of some of the 
provisions of the Securities Acts). 
 136. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (discussing deference in a public, not private, enforcement 
action); see also Andrew S. Gold, Reassessing the Scope of Conduct Prohibited by Section 10(b) 
and the Elements of Rule 10b-5: Reflections on Securities Fraud and Secondary Actors, 53 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 667, 695 (2004) (“Congress delegated authority to the SEC to prohibit certain 
conduct—it did not delegate authority to create private rights of action.  The question of how far 
to extend the private action is in essence a question of federal common law.”).  Additionally, 
following the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), the 
Court has accorded the Commission’s positions little weight with respect to ambiguities in that 
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positions in public enforcement actions should command such deference.  
Certainly, there are some issues of federal securities regulation that are 
distinctly public and some issues that are distinctly private.137  Emphasis on 
the public/private distinction, however, is misplaced.  A court’s deference to 
an agency’s interpretation depends on the issue at hand, not necessarily 
                                                                                                                 
statute.  Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.); see also Bressman, supra note 50, at 579 (“Congress likely intended courts to interpret 
the PSLRA or at least knew that they would.  The explanation is straightforward: courts have 
been the primary interpreters of securities law in the context of private class actions.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 137. For example, consider Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated 
thereunder, which serves as the workhorse for both public and private securities litigation.  See 
REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: SECTION 703 OF THE 
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002: STUDY AND REPORT ON VIOLATIONS BY SECURITIES 
PROFESSIONALS 9 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/sox703report.pdf (listing 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as the two most frequently enforced provisions of the federal 
securities laws); see also Nat Stern, The Constitutionalization of Rule 10b-5, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 
1 (1995) (asserting that “Rule 10b-5 is probably the most familiar and most frequently invoked 
securities regulation [which was] [p]romulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) under § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934” (footnotes omitted)).  
Aiding-and-abetting liability is a distinctly public action, meaning private litigants cannot 
successfully charge defendants with having aided and abetted securities violations of Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007); 
Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994) (“[W]e hold 
that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under § 10(b).”).  Only the 
government may pursue aiding-and-abetting charges against those defendants.  See 15 U.S.C. § 
78t(e) (2006). 
However, some issues that may arise in private securities litigation will not arise in the 
Commission’s enforcement actions.  For instance, although a private plaintiff must establish that 
he or she relied on the defendant’s misstatement or omission in an action under Section 10(b), the 
Commission need not establish such reliance.  See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. 
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 156 (2008) (noting the elements a private plaintiff must 
establish for a cause of action under Section 10(b)); STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, 
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 315 (2005).  Additionally, private plaintiffs 
must have purchased or sold securities to have standing to pursue their Section 10(b) claims, but 
the Commission is not similarly encumbered.  See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 
U.S. 723, 754–55 (1975) (imposing a standing requirement for private actions); see also 
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 664 (limiting the standing requirement to private actions); SEC v. Nat’l 
Secs., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 467 n.9 (1969) (same).  Further, private plaintiffs must have pursued 
such claims within a limitations period, but this period does not apply to actions by the SEC.  
See 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2006); see also Lampf v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 356–58 (1991) 
(interpreting a predecessor statute); SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1488–90 (9th Cir. 1993).  
When resolving the foregoing issues in private enforcement cases, the Court rejected the 
Commission’s positions without reference to Skidmore or Chevron deference.  See Lampf, 501 
U.S at 361 (rejecting, without any reference to Chevron, the Commission’s proposed five-year 
limitations period for a private action under Section 10(b)); see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 
425 U.S. 185, 197–98 (1975) (rejecting, without any reference to Skidmore, the Commission’s 
interpretation of what constitutes a “manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance”); Blue Chip 
Stamps, 421 U.S. at 738, 746 n.10 (1975) (rejecting, without any reference to Skidmore, the 
Commission’s interpretation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5). 
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whether that issue arises in private or public litigation.138  In fact, the Court 
has deferred to an agency’s interpretation of a statutory ambiguity when that 
ambiguity has arisen in private litigation.139 
Even if there were merit to the public/private distinction, the distinction 
seems irrelevant in definition-of-security cases.  Though some issues may be 
distinctly private or public, many issues apply to causes of action whether 
those actions are private or public.140  For example, under Section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, the defendant’s deception must have been “in 
connection with” a securities transaction whether a private litigant or the 
government pursued that defendant.141  Most pertinent to this Article, the 
requirement that the instrument offered or sold must have been a “security” 
straddles both private and public realms.  A court’s holding regarding the 
definition of “security” affects public enforcement, whether the issue arises in 
private litigation or not.142  A holding in a private action that is overly 
cramped unduly limits the Commission and prevents its own enforcement 
efforts.143  According deference to the SEC in a public enforcement action 
                                                 
 138. See Bressman, supra note 50, at 579 (arguing that “courts [sh]ould focus on legislative 
reasons for interpretive delegation by examining the nature of the issue”). 
 139. See Raymond B. Yates, M.D., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 12–18 
(2004) (according Skidmore deference to an agency’s interpretation of statutory ambiguity); see 
also Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 444–49 (2003) (same); 
Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (expressing willingness to accord Skidmore 
deference to an agency’s opinion letter, but ultimately finding the agency’s interpretation 
unpersuasive); Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714, 722–25 (1989) (according Chevron deference 
to an agency’s interpretation of statutory ambiguity). 
 140. See infra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 141. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007); Stoneridge, 552 
U.S. at 156; SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819–25 (2002); O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651–59. 
 142. See Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, Landreth Timber 
Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985) (No. 83-1961), 1984 WL 565898, at *3 (“The resolution of 
[the ‘security’ issue] will not only affect private litigation but could also significantly affect 
enforcement actions brought by the Commission.”); see also Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 3–4, Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) (No. 104), 1967 WL 
113740, at *3–4 (“The decision of the court of appeals that [the instrument] is not a ‘security’ as 
defined in that Act . . . would seem to preclude the Commission from acting for [investors’] 
protection.”). 
 143. See Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 4–5, Tcherepnin, 389 
U.S. 332 (No. 104), 1967 WL 113740, at *4–5 (“[T]he restrictive meaning the court of appeals 
has given to the statutory definition of the term ‘security,’ if allowed to stand, would seriously 
hamper the Commission’s efforts to deal with novel types of financial instruments as they 
appear.”); see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2, United 
Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (No. 74-157) (“The construction of the term 
‘security’ in these acts necessarily determines their applicability in Commission enforcement 
actions. . . . The Commission opposes restrictive constructions of the securities laws and of the 
Commission’s rules that would weaken the protections they afford investors and narrowly restrict 
the range of circumstances to which they apply.”). 
In resolving a private suit under Rule 10b-5, which proscribes the making of “any untrue 
statement”, the Supreme Court recently determined that one must have “ultimate authority” for a 
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regarding a particular issue,144 but failing to accord any deference to the 
Commission for the same issue that arises in a private action is troublingly 
inconsistent because both speak to the Commission’s reach.  Finally, 
emphasis on public-versus-private enforcement fails to capture the entirety of 
the Chevron Court’s discussion of administering the statute, 145  which 
contemplates both agency adjudication and rulemaking.146 
That an issue arises in private litigation should not determine whether a 
court accords deference to the SEC.  If the issue arises in private litigation, a 
court should accord deference to the Commission’s interpretation based upon 
familiar considerations such as whether the Commission promulgated a rule 
that addresses the issue following the appropriate notice-and-comment 
procedures or whether the SEC previously resolved the issue in a formal 
adjudication.147 
II.  STATUTORY INDICATIONS OF INTERPRETIVE DELEGATION 
Congress envisioned some malleability in securities laws, intending that the 
SEC mold regulation in certain circumstances.148  However, with respect to 
the definition of “security,” statutory interpretation arguments cut both ways.  
Some scholars argue that Congress delegated interpretive authority to the 
Commission, but others argue that Congress delegated this authority to the 
courts. 149   Given each argument’s persuasiveness, the Court should 
                                                                                                                 
statement in order to be held accountable.  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; see also Janus Capital 
Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011).  Thus, one corporate entity 
that crafted a statement would not be accountable if a second affiliated entity made the statement 
with the approval of its managing board.  See id.  The Court’s interpretation of the phrase 
“make any untrue statement,” may inhibit the SEC’s pursuit of those involved in securities fraud.  
See Alert Memorandum from Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, Supreme Court Limits 
Liability for False Statements Under Rule 10b-5 to Those with “Ultimate Authority” for Them, at 
3 (June 20, 2011) (discussing Janus Capital’s effect on Commission enforcement). 
 144. See, e.g., Zandford, 535 U.S. at 819–20 (according deference to the SEC in its 
enforcement action). 
 145. The Chevron Court spoke of “an agency’s construction of the statute which it 
administers,” and also of “an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking 
responsibilities.”  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842, 865 (1984). 
 146. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77s(a), 78w(a)(1) (2006); see also O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 673; supra 
note 134. 
 147. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001). 
 148. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (“The Commission shall have authority from time to time 
to make, amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the 
provisions of this subchapter”); id. § 78w(a)(1) (“The Commission . . . shall . . . have power to 
make such rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions 
of this chapter for which [it is] responsible or for the execution of the functions vested in [it] by 
this chapter . . . .”); S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 5 (1934) (noting that administrative flexibility is 
essential in regulating the “modern stock exchange,” but the limits of the entrusted agency’s 
authority should be clear). 
 149. Compare David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 
SUP. CT. REV. 201, 216 (“Judges can put into effect congressional decisions about the scope of 
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hold—and, according to at least one Justice, the Court has held—that, when 
there is ambiguity, “Chevron’s rule of deference applies to an agency’s . . . 
interpretation of its own statutory authority or jurisdiction.”150   Further, 
Congress has provided additional indications that it intended to give the SEC 
interpretive authority to define its own jurisdiction, including: the 
Commission’s power to define terms, its exemptive power, the context clause 
preceding the definition of “security,” and the significance of Congress’s 
overlapping, circular definition of “security.” 
A.  The Commission’s Authority to Define Terms 
In determining whether Congress intended for the Commission to serve as 
the primary interpreter of uncertainties regarding the definition of “security,” it 
is essential to examine the responsibilities with which Congress charged the 
SEC.  Congress delegated the authority to define terms in both the Securities 
Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and the Exchange Act to the SEC. 151  
Specifically, Congress empowered the Commission to define “technical and 
trade terms” used in the Securities Act and “technical, trade, . . . and other 
terms” used in the Exchange Act. 152   Although Congress itself defined 
                                                                                                                 
the Chevron doctrine only if Congress, as an initial matter, makes these decisions.”), with 
Bressman, supra  note  50,  at  551  (stating  that  “when  courts  find  no  ‘clear’  
meaning  for  the statutory text . . . they infer a delegation of interpretive authority to the 
agency”). 
 150. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 380–81 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted); see also Scalia, supra note 58, at 517 (“Congress now 
knows that the ambiguities it creates, whether intentionally or unintentionally, will be resolved, 
within the bounds of permissible interpretation, not by the courts but by a particular agency, 
whose policy biases will ordinarily be known.” (emphasis added)).  Other Justices agree with 
Justice Scalia.  United States v. Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305, 319 (2009) (stating that the Court 
should look to an agency for  interpretation of a statute’s scope and accept that application if it is 
reasonable). 
 151. See infra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 152. 15 U.S.C. § 77s (“The Commission shall have authority from time to time to make, 
amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of 
this subchapter, including rules and regulations . . . defining accounting, technical, and trade 
terms used in this title.”); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(b) (2006) (“The Commission . . .  as to matters within 
[its] jurisdiction[], shall have power by rules and regulations to define technical, trade, 
accounting, and other terms used in this chapter, consistently with the provisions and purposes of 
this chapter.”). 
Congress did not empower the Commission to define only trade terms and technical terms, but 
also accounting terms.  See 15 U.S.C. § 77s (“The Commission shall have authority from time to 
time to make, amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the 
provisions of this title, including rules and regulations . . . defining accounting, technical, and 
trade terms used in this subchapter.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(b) (2006) (substantially similar).  
The inclusion of accounting terms should neither cabin the SEC’s power to define terms in order 
to provide indirect guidance about the meaning of “security” nor prevent courts from according 
deference to that guidance.  Although accounting is a field that includes technical and trade 
terms, an interpretation that limits those terms to the field of accounting would render their 
inclusion as surplusage.  See Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 
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“security,” in so doing, it created a laundry list of more than twenty different 
financial instruments that comprise the definition.153  Thus, the definitional 
dilemma is not as simple as determining what constitutes a “security,” because 
                                                                                                                 
837 (1988) (“[W]e are hesitant to adopt an interpretation of a congressional enactment which 
renders superfluous another portion of that same law.” (footnote omitted)); see also Gustafson v. 
Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 586 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that the canon noscitur a 
sociis, meaning “a word is known by the company it keeps,” is not an obligation on the Court “to 
construe every term in a series narrowly because of the meaning given to just one of the terms” 
(citations omitted)).  Admittedly, an argument favoring such a narrow construction finds some 
support in the Securities Act.  As originally enacted, the Securities Act delegated the power to 
define only “accounting and trade terms.”  Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 19, 48 Stat. 74, 85 (1933).  
Immediately thereafter, Congress delegated to the Commission the authority to detail disclosures 
regarding accounting matters.  Congress empowered the Commission to determine the items to 
be included in the balance sheets and earnings statements generally described by Congress and, 
among other things, the appropriate methods of valuation and depreciation.  See id.  At first 
look, the grant of the power to define is immediately followed by detailed powers limited to 
matters of accounting, suggesting a narrow reading of the power to define. 
Upon closer inspection, however, the Court should not construe the power to define so 
narrowly as to limit it to the accounting field.  Context matters and the Court has repeatedly 
instructed that statutes should not be interpreted in a vacuum.  See, e.g., Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 
568 (noting that the Court must “construe statutes, not isolated provisions”). 
First, in section 19, Congress delegated the power to define terms for the entire title, even 
though it did not include any accounting terms other than those that appeared in section 19 and 
schedules A and B.  See Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74, 88–91 (1933).  Congress’s grant of 
authority to define terms extended to the entire Securities Act and was not limited to section 19 or 
schedules A and B, suggesting that “technical and trade terms” should not be interpreted so 
narrowly so as to apply only to matters of accounting. 
Second, Congress granted the SEC the power to define terms in the Exchange Act using 
similar language as found in the Securities Act.  More importantly, in the Exchange Act, 
Congress placed the power to define terms in section 3(b), which immediately follows the 
definitional section, suggesting that the power to define was relatively broad.  Finally, in 1934, 
Congress amended the Securities Act by adding “technical” terms to the Commission’s power to 
define, suggesting that Congress intended greater conformity between the two sections.  See 
Pub. L. No. 73-290, § 209(a), 48 Stat. 881, 908 (1934); see also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 
U.S. 56, 76 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring) (suggesting a uniform reading of the Securities and 
Exchange Acts); Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 n.1 (1985) (“We have 
repeatedly ruled that the definitions of ‘security’ in § 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act and § 2(1) of the 
1933 Act are virtually identical and will be treated as such in our decisions dealing with the scope 
of the term.” (citations omitted)). 
 153. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (“The term ‘security’ means any note, stock, treasury stock, 
security future, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation 
in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or 
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit 
for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, 
straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities 
(including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or 
privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, 
any interest or instrument commonly known as a ‘security,’ or any certificate of interest or 
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right 
to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2006) 
(substantially similar). 
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each of the twenty-plus congressionally enumerated instruments generates its 
own definitional dilemma.154  Congress used numerous ambiguous terms in 
compiling its list of securities, including technical and trade terms for which 
the SEC’s interpretive guidance would be beneficial to the public.155  The 
Commission’s authority to define terms, including any technical or trade terms 
included in Congress’s own definition of “security,” suggests that Congress 
intended for the SEC to have the primary role in interpreting the Commission’s 
own regulatory realm.156 
Congress specified rulemaking as the means by which the SEC could define 
terms.157  Accordingly, if the Commission promulgated a rule defining a 
technical or trade term that Congress included in its own definition of 
“security,” then courts should defer to the SEC’s definition if it is 
reasonable.158  However, if the Commission speaks to an interpretation of a 
term outside of the notice-and-comment rulemaking process, a court should not 
dismiss the SEC’s position.  By empowering the Commission to define terms, 
Congress indicated its preference that the Commission, rather than the courts, 
define technical and trade terms used in the the Securities Acts.159  Therefore, 
even when the SEC acts through methods other than rulemaking, courts should 
still accord substantial weight to its interpretation because of Congress’s 
preference that the Commission define such terms.160 
                                                 
 154. LOSS ET AL., supra note 32, at 859 n.6 (stating that each instrument may have its own 
definitional problems). 
 155. See Landreth, 471 U.S. at 686 (stating that this definition “includes both instruments 
whose names alone carry well-settled meaning, as well as instruments of ‘more variable character 
[that] were necessarily designated by more descriptive terms,’ such as ‘investment contract’ and 
‘instrument commonly known as a security’” (citation omitted) (alteration in original)); see also 
Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 584 (acknowledging the word “prospectus” as a “term of art”). 
 156. United States v. Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305, 319 (2009) (“This is the very situation in 
which we look to an authoritative agency for a decision about the statute’s scope, which is 
defined in cases at the statutory margin by the agency’s application of it, and once the choice is 
made we ask only whether the Department’s application was reasonable.”); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 
v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (“[T]he principle of deference to administrative 
interpretations has been consistently followed by this Court whenever decision as to the meaning 
or reach of a statute has involved reconciling conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the 
force of the statutory policy in the given situation has depended upon more than ordinary 
knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations.” (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 157. See supra note 152. 
 158. Compare Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 172–74 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(according Chevron deference to a Commission rule that narrowly defined a congressional 
exemption, which arguably expanded the Commission’s jurisdiction). 
 159. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-1838, at 30 (1934) (Conf. Rep.). 
 160. See id. (“The substitute retains the House provisions except that it is not provided that 
the definitions ‘shall have the force of law.’  This phrase was omitted as unnecessary, since 
courts commonly give the force of law to administrative interpretations of statutory terms, unless 
clearly inconsistent with the legislative intent.”); see also Bressman, supra note 50, at 587–88 
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Counter-arguments exist, but prove unconvincing.  For example, one might 
point to the phrase in the Exchange Act regarding the Commission’s power to 
define terms “as to matters within [its] . . . jurisdiction.”161  Although the 
definition of “security” may be considered jurisdictional,162 the SEC would be 
acting within its delegated powers and within its jurisdictional reach when 
defining a technical or trade term that Congress used in its definition of 
“security.”163 
A more general argument against the Commission’s definitional authority 
regarding “security” involves negative implications.  For example, in the 
Exchange Act, immediately after defining “security,” Congress defined “equity 
security,” and, in so doing, it expressly empowered the SEC to expand the 
definition of “equity security.” 164   Because Congress empowered the 
Commission to expand one congressionally provided definition (“equity 
security”), one arguably should give force to the absence of such 
empowerment in a closely related definitional section (“security”).  Even 
accepting this negative-implication argument, the Commission does not 
expand Congress’s definition of “security.”  Instead, the Commission is 
acting within its delegated power to define any technical or trade terms (or, for 
the Exchange Act, “any other terms”) that appear in Congress’s definition of 
“security.”165  Although the practical effect of exercising the power to define 
technical or trade terms may be to expand the class of securities, the 
Commission’s action would remain consistent with its congressionally 
delegated powers. 
Another statutory provision suggests that the courts—not the SEC—should 
define what constitutes a “security.”  In the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB 
Act), which amended the Exchange Act, Congress empowered the 
                                                                                                                 
(suggesting that an agency’s considered position commands substantial weight even if not the 
product of formal rulemaking). 
 161. See 15 U.S.C. 78c(b) (2006). 
 162. See supra Part I.A. 
 163. See Brief for Respondent at 35–36, Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 613 F.3d 166 (No. 
09-1021), available at http://sec.gov/litigation/briefs/2009/americanequitybrief0409.pdf (arguing 
that the Commission is not expanding its jurisdiction by promulgating a rule that narrowly defines 
an ambiguous statutory exemption). 
 164. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(11) (“The term ‘equity security’ means any stock . . . or any 
other security which the Commission shall deem to be of similar nature and consider necessary or 
appropriate, by such rules and regulations as it may prescribe in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors, to treat as an equity security.”).  Section 3(a)(11) is not the only 
definitional  section  that  Congress  empowered  the  Commission  to  adjust.  See,  
e.g.,  id.  §  78c(a)(12)(A)(vii)  (“The  term  ‘exempted  security’  or  ‘exempted 
securities’ includes . . . such other securities . . . as the Commission may . . . exempt from the 
operation of any one or more provisions of this chapter which do not apply to an ‘exempted 
security’ or to ‘exempted securities’”); id. § 78c(a)(23)(B)(iii) (empowering the Commission to 
expand the definition by ruling against a congressionally created exclusion); id. § 78c(a)(35)(C) 
(empowering the Commission to expand upon the definition of “investment discretion”). 
 165. Id. § 78c(b); H.R. REP. NO. 73-1838, at 4 (1934) (Conf. Rep.). 
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Commission to regulate products that it determines to be “hybrid” products.166  
The GLB Act, however, also provided that the “court shall determine to affirm 
and enforce or set aside a regulation of the Commission . . . , based on the 
determination  of  the  court  as  to  whether  .  .  .  the  subject 
product is a  security . . . .”167  The GLB Act’s empowerment of the 
judiciary to review the Commission’s definition of “security” may suggest that 
Congress intended for the courts—not the SEC—to be the primary interpretive 
authority.  The weakness in this argument is that, although the courts may 
make the final determination,168 they could do so and still accord great 
deference to the Commission’s conclusions.169  As an alternative response, 
the negative-implication argument now favors deference to the SEC rather than 
the courts.  That is, by expressly empowering courts to make the final 
determination of whether an instrument constitutes a “hybrid security,” but not 
expressly empowering the courts to make the final determination of whether an 
instrument constitutes a “security,” the negative-implication argument suggests 
that Congress intended the Commission to be interpreter-in-chief of what 
instruments constitute “securities.”170 
B.  The Commission’s Exemptive Powers 
Congress delegated broad powers to the SEC to exempt any security or class 
of securities from any provision of the Securities Acts or from any rules and 
regulations promulgated thereunder.171  In permitting the Commission to 
                                                 
 166. See  Pub.  L.  No.  106-102,  §  205,  113  Stat.  1338,  1391  (1999)  
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(i)(3) (2006)) (“Criteria for Rulemaking.—The Commission shall not 
impose a requirement under paragraph (2) of this subsection with respect to any new hybrid 
product unless the Commission determines that—(A) the new hybrid product is a security; and 
(B) imposing such requirement is necessary and appropriate in the public interest and for the 
protection of investors.”). 
 167. Pub.  L.  No.  106-102,  §  205,  113  Stat.  1338,  1393  (1999)  (codified  
at  15 U.S.C. § 78o(i)(5)(D) (2006)). 
 168. Note that a court may not actually make the “final determination” because an agency’s 
subsequent interpretation may control.  See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83 (2005) (upholding an agency’s new interpretation of statutory 
ambiguity as reasonable, despite a lower court holding setting forth a different meaning of the 
ambiguity when it deemed the agency’s prior interpretation of the ambiguity unreasonable). 
 169. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (deferring to the agency’s 
definition despite the requirement of 5 U.S.C. § 706 that courts decide all questions of law); see 
also Bressman, supra note 50, at 587–88 (“[Even] if the statute delegates interpretive authority to 
courts, they could rely less on traditional tools of statutory construction and more on the agency’s 
practical experience with the regulatory regime.”); Duffy, supra note 27, at 202 (arguing that 
although the courts resolve all questions of law, some statutes confer lawmaking authority on 
agencies). 
 170. See  Pub.  L.  No.  106-102, § 205,  113  Stat.  1338,  1391–92  (1999)  
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(i)(5)(D) (2006)) (conferring on the courts the authority to determine 
if a product is a hybrid security). 
 171. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3 (2006) (“The Commission, by rule or regulation, may 
conditionally or unconditionally exempt any person, security, or transaction, or any class or 
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exempt any security or class of securities, Congress required it to consider the 
public interest,172 which, in turn, requires consideration of the interests of 
investors as well as those seeking financing.173 
Investing parties and those who are seeking financing sit on opposite sides 
of the table before the money changes hands, but their post-investment 
interests frequently align.  Therefore, Congress entrusted the Commission to 
balance each party’s competing interests in determining what federal securities 
laws, if any, should apply to their negotiations and any resulting instrument.174  
That Congress delegated the authority to the SEC to determine whether the 
securities laws should apply to a particular instrument—for purposes of 
exemption—is instructive.  It suggests that the Commission, as opposed to the 
courts, should wield greater influence when determining whether the securities 
laws should apply to a particular instrument for purposes of defining 
“security.”175 
The balancing of interests of various groups of the public is a complex 
undertaking and not readily appreciated by those lacking expertise.176  The 
                                                                                                                 
classes of persons, securities, or transactions, from any provision or provisions of this title or of 
any rule or regulation issued under this subchapter, to the extent that such exemption is necessary 
or appropriate in the public  interest,  and  is  consistent  with  the  protection  of  
investors.”);  see  also  15 U.S.C. § 78mm(a)(1) (“[T]he Commission, by rule, regulation, or 
order, may conditionally or unconditionally exempt any person, security, or transaction, or any 
class or classes of persons, securities, or transactions, from any provision or provisions of this 
chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, to the extent that such exemption is necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with the protection of investors.”).  Notably, 
the Exchange Act includes a limitation on the Commission’s exemptive authority with respect to 
a narrowly specified class of securities.  See id. § 78mm(b).  The narrowness of the limitation 
suggests the broadness of the SEC’s exemptive authority. 
 172. See 15 U.S.C. § 78z-3 (“[T]o the extent that such exemption is necessary or appropriate 
in the  public  interest,  and  is  consistent  with  the  protection  of  investors.”);  see  
also 15 U.S.C. § 77mm(a)(1) (same). 
 173. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2006) (“Whenever pursuant to this title the Commission is 
engaged in rulemaking and is required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection 
of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”).  
Although there is no parallel provision in the Exchange Act, its absence does not does not 
preclude the SEC’s consideration of whether the action will “promote efficiency, competition, 
and capital formation,” which impacts the public and its interest, considerations set forth in the 
Exchange Act.  See id. § 78mm(a)(1). 
 174. See infra notes 175–76. 
 175. See Brief for Petitioner at 16, SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (No. 843), 
1946 WL 50582 (“[I]t [is] apparent from the scheme of the [1933] Act as a whole that Congress 
relied primarily upon the exemption provisions, and the exercise of administrative discretion 
thereunder, to avoid impractical application of the full regulatory provisions to situations in which 
the burdens upon the promoter [issuer of the securities] might be thought to be disproportionate to 
the need for protection of investors.”). 
 176. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 4 (1934) (“With such concentration of national wealth in 
the form of liquid corporate securities the economic machinery of the whole country is now 
affected by, and is organized primarily to serve, security markets which are as sensitive as a hair 
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Chevron Court indicated that deference to the administering agency is 
appropriate when the agency can act as the expert.177  In discussing the 
importance of expertise when determining a statute’s reach, the Chevron Court 
suggested the appropriateness of deference to an agency regarding 
jurisdictional matters.178 
However, some scholars may argue that the power to exclude, or exempt an 
instrument, neither encompasses nor necessitates the power to include, or treat 
an instrument as a “security.”  Arguably, courts need not accord any 
deference to the Commission’s determination that an instrument is a 
“security,” 179  particularly because the SEC is more generous than 
parsimonious in making this determination.180  Perhaps Congress trusts the 
Commission when the Commission determines that the balance tips in one 
direction (exemption), but does not trust the Commission’s determination that 
the balance tips in the opposite direction (inclusion). 
In response, Congress did not limit the SEC’s broad exemptive powers to 
securities or classes of securities. 181   The Commission can couple its 
treatment of an instrument as a “security” with exemptive relief from 
provisions of the federal securities laws if such laws are redundant or 
otherwise unnecessary.  For example, after defining an instrument as a 
“security,” the SEC could exempt that security from burdensome obligations 
such as disclosure requirements or liability provisions.182   Congressional 
delegation of such broad exemptive powers suggests that court deference to the 
SEC is appropriate whether the Commission favors an instrument’s treatment 
as a “security” or not.183 
                                                                                                                 
trigger.”); see also Karmel, supra note 12, at 35 (“The articulation of new standards is a difficult 
business, especially in a dynamic and fast paced area like securities regulation.”). 
 177. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984). 
 178. Id. at 844 (“[T]he principle of deterrence to administrative interpretations has been 
consistently followed by this Court whenever the decision as to the reach of a statute has involved 
reconciling conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the 
given situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters 
subjected to agency regulations.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 179. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 693–94 (1985). 
 180. See LOSS ET AL., supra note 32, at 1209 (suggesting that the Commission “contends for 
a liberal application of this definition [of ‘security’]”). 
 181. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-3, 78mm(a)(1) (2006); see also S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 14 (1934) 
(“Thus the Commission is able to remove from the operation of any one or more of these 
provisions any securities as to which it deems such provisions inappropriate.  It may attach such 
conditions to such exemptions as it deems desirable.”). 
 182. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence 
and its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1582–84 (2006) (proposing that the 
Commission exempt non-trading corporations from class action liability under Rule 10b-5). 
 183. See Bressman, supra note 50, at 584 (stating that a court should rarely conclude that an 
agency overstepped its authority). 
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C.  Congress’s Context Clause 
In the Securities Acts, Congress provided that, “unless the context otherwise 
requires  .  .  .  the  term  ‘security’  means  any  note,  stock,  
treasury stock . . . .”184  By including this “context clause,” Congress clearly 
delegated an interpretive power with respect to its definition of “security.”  
Congress did not, however, indicate clearly whether the power should be 
exercised by the courts, the SEC, or both.  Two theories have emerged as to 
the meaning of the context clause.  According to the first theory, “context” 
means the appearance of the term “security” elsewhere in the federal securities 
laws. 185   According to the second theory, “context” means the factual 
circumstances of the transaction being scrutinized.186  Statutory clues and 
Court precedent lend support to both theories. 
1.  Context from Surrounding Sections 
Congress could have intended “context” to refer to other portions of the 
federal securities laws.  Such usage would reflect the common definition of 
“context” as “the parts of a discourse that surround a word or passage and can 
throw light on its meaning.”187  The Court has endorsed the interpretation that 
the context clause is Congress’s way of cautioning that the same word may 
take on different meanings within different provisions of the federal securities 
laws.188 
The context clause does not just modify the definition of “security;” it 
modifies every term Congress set forth in its definitional section.  In the 
Securities Act, the context clause precedes more than fifteen terms; and in the 
Exchange Act, the context clause precedes more than sixty terms.189  Because 
there are numerous terms that could take on different definitions depending on 
the provisions in which they appear, the statute’s construction favors the 
                                                 
 184. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2006) 
(emphasis added). 
 185. See infra notes 188–91 and accompanying text. 
 186. See infra notes 192–206 and accompanying text. 
 187. WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 250 (10th ed. 2002) [hereinafter WEBSTER’S]. 
 188. See SEC v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969) (“Congress itself has cautioned 
that the same words may take on a different coloration in different sections of the securities laws; 
both the 1933 and the 1934 Acts preface their lists of general definitions with the phrase ‘unless 
the context otherwise requires.’” (citations omitted)); see also Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 
561, 588–89 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Despite the majority’s protestations, it is 
absolutely clear that the 1933 Act uses ‘prospectus’ in two different ways. . . . [T]his 
understanding is reinforced by § 2’s preface that its definitions apply ‘unless the context 
otherwise requires.’ This phrase indicates that Congress intended simply to provide a ‘default’ 
meaning for ‘prospectus.’” (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77b)); id. at 598 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(“According ‘prospectus’ discrete meanings in § 10 and § 12(2) is consistent with Congress’ 
specific instruction in § 2 that definitions apply ‘unless the context otherwise requires.’” (citing 
15 U.S.C. § 77b)). 
 189. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(16), 78c(a)(64). 
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argument that Congress intended an expert to interpret those terms.190  In this 
regard, the context clause could represent congressional delegation to the 
Commission, empowering it to adjust Congress’s definition to capture or 
exclude a particular instrument as a “security.”  Moreover, the context clause 
was unnecessary to empower the courts to deviate from statutory language,191 
so its inclusion may have been intended to empower the SEC. 
2.  Context from Factual Circumstances 
Alternatively, Congress could have intended the context clause to mean the 
factual circumstances surrounding the particular transaction under scrutiny.  
“Context” also means: “[T]he interrelated conditions in which something exists 
or occurs: ENVIRONMENT, SETTING.”192  The legislative history of the 
context clause supports this meaning as well.193   An early draft of the 
Securities Act preceded the definitional section with the language “unless the 
text otherwise indicates.” 194   By rejecting the proposed text clause and 
enacting the context clause, Congress seemingly favored considerations of 
factual circumstances beyond just the text of the statute. 
This interpretation of the context clause finds support in several of the 
Court’s decisions regarding the existence of a “security.”  In Marine Bank v. 
Weaver, the Court specifically referenced the transactional nature of the 
inquiry and the importance of “the factual setting.”195  The Court emphasized 
the factual context of the transaction in question by highlighting its uniqueness 
                                                 
 190. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 688 (1985) (“[T]he reach of the 
Act does not stop with the obvious and commonplace.” (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943))); see also Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 856 (1984) (discussing the EPA’s usage of two definitions for a 
single term and arguing for “a flexible rather than a rigid definition of the term ‘source’ to 
implement various policies and programs”). 
 191. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (“It is a 
familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, 
because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers. This has been often asserted, 
and the reports are full of cases illustrating its application.”). 
 192. WEBSTER’S, supra note 187, at 250; see also Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 
558–59 (1982). 
 193. Reliance on legislative history can be fraught with peril.  See WILLIAM E. ESKRIDGE, 
JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 948–49 (3d ed. 2002) (“Lobbyists and 
lawyers maneuver endlessly to persuade staff members (who write the committee reports) or their 
legislative bosses to throw in helpful language in the reports when insertion of similar language 
would be inappropriate or infeasible for the statute itself.”); see also Patricia M. Wald, Some 
Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. 
REV. 195, 214 (1983) (describing citations to legislative history as “looking over a crowd and 
picking out your friends” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the Honorable Harold 
Leventhal)). 
 194. S. 875, 73d Cong. § 2 (1933); H.R. 4314, 73d Cong. § 2 (1933) (emphasis added); LOSS 
ET AL., supra note 32, at 862 & n.15. 
 195. Weaver, 455 U.S. at 560 n.11. 
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in determining that the instrument was not a “security.”196  Additionally, the 
Court noted that, given the surrounding circumstances, the transaction would 
be subject to federal regulation even if the federal securities laws were 
inapplicable.197  In Reves v. Ernst & Young, the Court similarly emphasized 
the factual context of the transaction by contrasting a corporate note to finance 
an enterprise, which would be a “security,” with an individual’s home 
mortgage note, which would not be a “security,” concluding that, when 
Congress wrote “any note,” it did not literally mean “any note.”198 
If the context clause refers to the factual circumstances of the transaction 
under scrutiny, then Congress may have intended for the courts to determine 
whether the context otherwise requires that the definition of “security” be 
altered to include or exclude the instrument.  Arguably, the Commission 
should adopt broadly applicable rules instead of formulating policy via 
individual enforcement actions and their unique factual circumstances.199  
                                                 
 196. Id. at 560 (finding that “[t]he provision that the Weavers could use the barn and pastures 
of the slaughterhouse at the discretion of the Piccirillos underscores the unique character of the 
transaction. . . . Accordingly, we hold that this unique agreement, negotiated one-on-one by the 
parties, is not a security.” (footnote omitted)).  The court emphasized that “[e]ach transaction 
must be analyzed and evaluated on the basis of the content of the instruments in question, the 
purposes intended to be served, and the factual setting as a whole.”  Id. at 560 n.11. 
 197. See id. at 558–59 (“The definition of ‘security’ in the 1934 Act provides that an 
instrument which seems to fall within the broad sweep of the Act is not to be considered a 
security if the context otherwise requires.  It is unnecessary to subject issuers of bank certificates 
of deposit to liability under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws since the holders 
of bank certificates of deposit are abundantly protected under the federal banking laws.”).  The 
Court’s emphasis on alternative regulatory schemes has been criticized.  First, the protections 
provided by the federal securities laws generally are cumulative of other legal protections.  See, 
e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77p (2006) (“Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the rights and 
remedies provided by this subchapter shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies 
that may exist at law or in equity.”); 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2006) (virtually identical).  Second, 
the Court first referred to an alternative regulatory scheme as additional support for a conclusion 
already reached.  See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 569 (1978) (“If any 
further evidence were needed . . . the enactment of ERISA in 1974 . . . would put the matter to 
rest.”); see also Marc I. Steinberg & William E. Kaulbach, The Supreme Court and the Definition 
of “Security”: The “Context” Clause, “Investment Contract” Analysis, and Their Ramifications, 
40 VAND. L. REV. 489, 505–06 (1987) (criticizing the Court’s analysis that considers an 
alternative regulatory scheme sufficient to render the federal securities laws inapplicable).  In 
Weaver, an alternative regulatory scheme grew in importance for the Court’s analysis.  See 
Weaver, 455 U.S. at 502. 
 198. See 494 U.S. 56, 63 (1990) (stating that “the phrase ‘any note’ should not be interpreted 
literally as ‘any note’”); see also Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 694 (1985) 
(“‘[N]ote’ may now be viewed as a relatively broad term that encompasses instruments with 
widely varying characteristics, depending on whether issued in a consumer context, as 
commercial paper, or in some other investment context.”). 
 199. See Karmel, supra note 12, at 41 (“As a Commissioner, I was . . . opposed to both 
substantive and procedural jurisdictional expansionism through enforcement prosecutions.”); see 
also Stephenson, supra note 49, at 1060 (“[F]or statutes that require application of general 
standards to the facts of particular cases on a more individualized basis—for example, antifraud 
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Because courts speak only to individual cases, a court necessarily focuses on 
the factual circumstances in which those cases arise.200  Thus, a court would 
defer to the content of the agency’s rules, but would not defer to an agency’s 
unadorned application of rules to those facts.201 
The question arises, if the context clause was an implicit delegation of 
interpretive power by Congress to the SEC, then why did Congress—within 
certain defined terms preceded by the context clause—expressly empower the 
Commission to alter those definitions?202  Some scholars argue that the 
inclusion of implicit and explicit power is mere redundancy.  In contrast, 
                                                                                                                 
laws . . . —legislators would tend to favor delegation to courts because such statutes implicate a 
larger number of discrete interpretive issues of roughly comparable importance.”). 
 200. See United Hous. Found. Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975) (“The task has fallen 
to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the body charged with administering the 
Securities Acts, and ultimately to the federal courts to decide which of the myriad financial 
transactions in our society come within the coverage of these statutes.” (emphasis added)).  That 
a court decides only one case at a time may be an oversimplification.  Because of stare decisis, 
individual court decisions commonly serve as long-lasting rules.  A court may be hesitant to 
reverse its interpretation of a statute because it may expect the legislature to fix any interpretive 
error.  See  ESKRIDGE  ET  AL.,  supra  note  193,  app.  B,  at  20  (“CONTINUITY  
IN LAW: . . . Super-strong presumption of correctness for statutory precedents.”); see also Scalia, 
supra note 58, at 517 (“One of the major disadvantages of having the courts resolve ambiguities 
is that they resolve them for ever and ever; only statutory amendment can produce a change.”).  
However, a strength of the argument for delegation to courts is the courts’ temporal consistency 
(stare decisis), which enhances third parties’ understanding and compliance.  Arguably, this may 
hinder the development of the law necessary to capture new instruments designed to evade 
existing regulation.  See Peters, supra note 78, at 292 (“[I]t is virtually axiomatic that the market 
will try to overcome any cabining regulation.”).  Thus, regulatory flexibility is required. 
 201. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 679 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
When an agency’s own rule is ambiguous, courts routinely defer to the agency’s interpretation of 
that ambiguity.  See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); see also Bowles v. Seminole 
Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). 
 202. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(11) (2006) (“When used in this chapter, unless the context 
otherwise requires—The term ‘equity security’ means any stock . . . or any other security which 
the Commission shall deem to be of similar nature and consider necessary or appropriate, by such 
rules and regulations as it may prescribe in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to 
treat as an equity security.”); id. § 78c(a)(12)(A)(vii) (“When used in this chapter, unless the 
context  otherwise  requires—The  term  ‘exempted  security’  or  ‘exempted  
securities’ includes . . . such other securities . . . as the Commission may . . . exempt from the 
operation of any one or more provisions of this chapter which do not apply to an ‘exempted 
security’ or to ‘exempted securities’”). 
A response to this belief is that Congress routinely has employed a belts-and-suspenders 
approach to the federal securities laws.  See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 
383 (1983) (“[I]t is hardly a novel proposition that the [1933 and 1934 Acts] prohibit some of the 
same conduct.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also SEC v. Nat’l Secs., Inc. 393 U.S. 
453, 468 (1969) (“The fact that there may well be some overlap is neither unusual nor 
unfortunate.”).  Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78mm (2006) (providing the Commission with general 
exemptive authority), with 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12)(A)(vii) (2006) (providing the Commission with 
particularized exemptive authority), and 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(2) (2006) (also providing the 
Commission with particularized exemptive authority).  Consequently, arguments of negative 
implication may lack their typical force. 
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some justices have interpreted the context clause as a delegation to the 
courts.203 
Perhaps this theory asks the context clause to bear more weight than it can 
withstand.  If there was no context clause, courts would look to the factual 
context.204  Therefore, according such a meaning to the context clause may be 
amiss, particularly when courts decide only one case at a time and necessarily 
focus on its factual setting or context.  Moreover, if the context clause serves 
as a delegation to the courts, the courts “could rely less on traditional tools of 
statutory construction and more on the agency’s practical experience with the 
regulatory regime.”205  Given that policy considerations play a significant role 
in defining “security,” greater reliance by a court on the administering agency 
seems particularly appropriate.206 
D.  Congress’s Overlapping and Circular Definition 
In section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act and section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange 
Act, Congress defined “security” broadly, setting forth a number of financial 
instruments.207  In deciding whether an instrument constitutes a “security,” 
the Court has determined that those congressionally enumerated instruments 
                                                 
 203. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 75–76 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]he exclusion for short-term 
notes must be read in light of the prefatory language in § 2 of the 1933 Act and § 3 of the 1934 
Act. . . . The context clause thus permits a judicial construction of the statute which harmonizes 
the facially rigid terms of the 9-month exclusion with the evident intent of Congress.” (emphasis 
added)); see also id. at 81 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“leaves it to the judiciary to flesh out 
additional ‘context clause’ exceptions”); Exch. Nat’l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 
1138 (2d Cir. 1976) (“So long as the statutes remain as they have been for over forty years, courts 
had better not depart from their words without strong support for the conviction that, under the 
authority vested in them by the ‘context’ clause, they are doing what Congress wanted when they 
refuse to do what is said.” (emphasis added)). 
 204. See LOSS ET AL., supra note 32, at 860 (describing the context clause as an “explicit 
reminder of a doctrine of statutory construction that should be implicit in any event”). 
 205. Bressman, supra note 50, at 587–88. 
 206. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 694 n.7 (1985) (“[I]t is proper for a 
court to consider—as we do today—policy considerations in construing terms in these Acts.”); 
see also Stoneridge Inv. Partners LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 164 (2008) 
(“Overseas firms with no other exposure to our securities laws could be deterred from doing 
business here. This, in turn, may raise the cost of being a publicly traded company under our law 
and shift securities offerings away from domestic capital markets.” (citations omitted)); Blue 
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975) (weighing policy considerations in 
reaching its conclusion); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 345 (1967) (“Policy considerations 
lead us to conclude that the petitioners are entitled to the investor protections afforded by the 
Securities Exchange Act.”). 
 207. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1), 78c(a)(10) (2006); see also Reves, 494 U.S. at 61 (“Congress 
therefore did not attempt precisely to cabin the scope of the Securities  Acts.”  (footnote  
omitted));  Tcherepnin,  389  U.S.  at  338  (“Even  a  casual reading of § 3(a)(10) of the 
1934 Act reveals that Congress did not intend to adopt a narrow or restrictive concept of security 
in defining that term.”); H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 11 (1933); LOSS ET AL., supra note 32, at 
858–59 n.6. 
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substantially overlap.208  In Tcherepnin v. Knight, the Court determined that 
the instruments in question constituted securities because they were 
“investment contract[s],” “certificate[s] of interest or participation in any 
profit-sharing agreement,” “stock,” and “transferable share[s].”209  In SEC v. 
C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., the Court indicated that the instruments constituted 
both “investment contract[s]” and “instrument[s] commonly known as 
securit[ies].”210  Congress’s overlapping of definitional terms invites and 
enhances an agency’s discretion to regulate.211  Further, Congress defined 
“security” by using the term “security,”212 a circular logic that amounts to a 
delegation of interpretive authority, prompting the Court to defer to the 
agency’s interpretation.213 
III.  NON-DEFERENCE AND ITS IMPACT 
In cases of statutory ambiguity,214 either a court or the relevant agency will 
provide clarity.  Between the two, the agency possesses greater subject matter 
expertise, better appreciates the conflicting policies implicated by the 
ambiguity, and better understands the consequences that follow alternative 
                                                 
 208. See Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 339 (“But we need not rest our decision on that conclusion 
[that the instrument constitutes an ‘investment contract’] alone. . . . The petitioners’ shares fit well 
within several other descriptive terms contained in § 3(a)(10).”); see also SEC v. C.M. Joiner 
Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943) (“Instruments may be included within any of these 
definitions, as matter of law, if on their face they answer to the name or description.”).  
Although the Court later disclaimed the argument that the Howey test for “investment contracts” 
was the lone test for determining the existence of a “security,” the Forman Court stated that the 
Howey test “embodies the essential attributes that run through all of the Court’s decisions 
defining a security.”  United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975); see also 
Gordon, supra note 44, at 403 (charting the similarities between the Court’s “investment 
contract” inquiry and its “note” inquiry).  Additionally, the Forman Court “perceive[d] no 
distinction . . . between an ‘investment contract’ and an ‘instrument commonly known as a 
‘security.’”  Forman, 421 U.S. at 852; see also LOSS ET AL., supra note 32, at 863 n.19 (“There 
has been surprisingly little judicial or administrative construction of the phrase [‘any interest or 
instrument commonly known as a “security”’], perhaps because other phrases, especially 
investment contract, normally satisfy any reasonable plaintiff.”). 
 209. See Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 339. 
 210. See Joiner, 320 U.S. at 351. 
 211. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 862 (1984) (“[I]t would appear that 
the listing of overlapping, illustrative terms was intended to enlarge, rather than to confine, the 
scope of the agency’s power to regulate particular sources in order to effectuate the policies of the 
Act.”). 
 212. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1), 78c(a)(10) (2006) (“The term ‘security’ means . . . any interest 
or instrument commonly known as a ‘security’ . . . .”). 
 213. See Raymond B. Yates, M.D., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 12–18 
(2004) (according Skidmore deference to an agency’s interpretation of Congress’s circular 
definition); see also Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 444–49 
(2003) (same). 
 214. To reiterate, if a statute is unambiguous, Congress left no interpretive gap for the agency 
to fill so Congress’s clear intent must be enforced.  See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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resolutions of the ambiguity.215  Consequently, when a court deviates from 
the agency’s interpretation, an inferior outcome is more likely to result than if 
the court had deferred to the agency’s interpretation.216  In some cases, by 
failing to defer to the SEC’s expertise, the Supreme Court has unnecessarily 
addressed issues and then resolved them incorrectly.  Such judicial action has 
generated confusion among the lower courts and has required, or will require, 
redressing by the Supreme Court. 
A.  United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman 
When United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman was decided, the Court 
acknowledged that deference to agency interpretations was the norm. 217  
Nevertheless, the Forman Court did not defer to the SEC’s position.218  In 
Forman, the Court addressed whether the instruments acquired by tenants of 
the issuer constituted “investment contracts” and were thus considered 
securities.219  As set forth by the Court, the test was “whether the scheme 
involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come 
solely from the efforts of others.”220  Under this test, the Court must consider 
the definition of “profits” and whose “efforts” generated those profits. 
                                                 
 215. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (“[T]he principle of deference to administrative 
interpretations has been consistently followed by this Court whenever . . . a full understanding of 
the force of the statutory policy in the given situation has depended upon more than ordinary 
knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations.” (citations omitted) (internal 
quotations marks omitted)).  The Court also emphasized that “[j]udges are not experts in the 
field . . . .”  Id. at 865; see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) 
(“Chevron did nothing to eliminate Skidmore’s holding that an agency’s interpretation may merit 
some deference . . . , given the specialized experience and broader investigations and information 
available to the agency . . . .” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 216. See Brief for Petitioner at 30, 37–38, SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (No. 
843), 1946 WL 50582 (criticizing the lower court’s inquiry as “administratively impractical,” and 
arguing that “the consequence is to afford loopholes for those who may desire to evade the Act” 
and the inquiry “invite[s] extended litigation in those cases where the form of the security is novel 
and differs from more orthodox types in general use”); see also Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 
197, at 492, 529 (arguing that “Weaver serves as a compelling focus for an even more serious 
problem: The Supreme Court’s apparent inability to comprehend thoroughly and to address 
analytically, consistently with the language, legislative history, and underlying policies of the 
securities acts, the important issues of federal securities regulation” and further asserting that 
Weaver “is an example of judicial activism at its worst”). 
 217. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 855 n.25 (1975) (“Traditionally 
the views of an agency charged with administering the governing statute would be entitled to 
considerable weight.” (citations omitted)). 
 218. See id. at 849–58. 
 219. 15  U.S.C.  §§  77b(a)(1),  78c(a)(10)  (2006)  (“The  term  ‘security’  means  
any . . . investment contract . . . .”); see also Forman, 421 U.S. at 840. 
 220. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852 (quoting Howey, 328 U.S. 301) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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1.  Rejecting the Commission’s Position Regarding “Profits” 
The Court determined that consumption does not constitute an investment, 
which would prohibit treatment of the instrument as an “investment 
contract.”221  The Court concluded that, in this case, “there can be no doubt 
that investors were attracted solely by the prospect of acquiring a place to live, 
and not by financial returns on their investment.”222  Therefore, according to 
the Court, the individuals were consuming, not investing for profit.223  Next, 
the Court launched into a discussion regarding the concept of “profits,” 
according no deference to the Commission’s longstanding position.224  The 
Court narrowly construed “profits” as “either capital appreciation . . . or a 
participation in earnings . . . .”225  By contrast, the SEC had recognized that a 
financial opportunity may involve both aspects of consumption and investment 
for profit.226  To conclude that the transaction constituted an “investment 
contract,” the Commission required only that the investment aspect 
predominate, not that the consumptive aspect be absent.227  By not deferring 
to the Commission’s interpretation and instead favoring an overly cramped 
definition of profits, the Court easily emphasized the exclusivity of 
consumption and the total absence of investment.228 
The facts of Forman indicate that the individuals had to purchase the 
instruments in question in order to gain access to housing.229  The purchasers 
of the instruments, who were of modest means,230 would not tie up their 
limited resources to acquire access to just any apartment, particularly when 
apartments could be obtained without purchasing such instruments. 231  
                                                 
 221. Id. at 852–53 (reasoning that purchasers who consume are not seeking a profit from 
their financial contribution); see also Gordon, supra note 44, at 396. 
 222. Forman, 421 U.S. at 853 (emphasis added). 
 223. Nevertheless, interestingly and confusingly, the Court continually referred to the tenants 
as “investors.” See generally Forman, 421 U.S. 387. 
 224. See id. at 851–53. 
 225. Id. at 852. 
 226. See In re Natural Res. Corp., 8 SEC 635 (1941); see also Guidelines as to the 
Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to Offers and Sales of Condominiums or Units in a 
Real Estate Development, Securities Act Release No. 5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735, 1735–36 (Jan. 4, 
1973). 
 227. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 28 (5th 
ed. 2006) (“Investment Versus Consumption”); see also LOSS ET AL., supra note 32, at 942 
(“weighing of the purposes of an investment”). 
 228. Forman, 421 U.S. at 853 & n.17 (“In some transactions the investor is offered both a 
commodity or real estate for use and an expectation of profits. . . . The application of the federal 
securities laws to these transactions may raise difficult questions that are not present in this 
case.”). 
 229. Id. at 842 (describing the requirement of share purchases to obtain housing). 
 230. Id. at 841 (“wage earners and other persons of low or moderate income”). 
 231. See id. at 842–43, 856 (highlighting the difficulty for the tenant to “sell [the instrument] 
for more than the initial purchase price” and noting that “income—if indeed there is any—is far 
too speculative and insubstantial”). 
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Instead, the individuals purchased the instruments to obtain housing at a deep 
discount relative to market rates for comparable housing232—essentially to 
obtain an economic profit.  The Court’s cramped conception of “profits,” 
including only capital appreciation and dividends that were impossible and 
unlikely, accorded no deference to the SEC’s conception of “profits.”233  The 
Court faulted the Commission’s position that the individuals had an 
expectation of profits attributable, in part, to “savings based on the fact that 
apartments [offered by the seller of the instruments] . . . cost substantially less 
than comparable nonsubsidized housing.”234  The Court stated, “this [was] an 
inappropriate theory of ‘profits’ that [it] could not accept.”235  The Court’s 
interpretation runs contrary not only to its overarching instruction to “examine 
. . . the economic realities of the transaction,”236 but also to the longstanding 
position of the Commission to focus on substance over form.237  When 
focusing on substance, one should not distinguish between a dollar earned and 
a dollar saved.  Attempting that distinction offends not only economics, but 
also common sense.238  For one to have “zero profit” would indicate that one 
rents the same quality apartment at the same rate as others.239  In Forman, the 
                                                 
 232. See Forman v. Cmty. Servs., Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1117, 1124 n.27 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) 
(“Relatively speaking, Co-op City still offers one of the lowest rent structures of any 
Mitchell-Lama housing in New York City.”).  Perhaps unlike other comparably priced housing, 
the  offered  housing  presented  a  “favorable  environment  for  family . . . community 
atmosphere . . . [and] very little turnover.”  Forman, 421 U.S. at 854 (quoting the Information 
Bulletin in App. 162a, 166a of the District Court’s record). 
 233. See Forman, 421 U.S. at 858–59 n.25. 
 234. Id. at 846. 
 235. Id. at 855. 
 236. Id. at 851; see also SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946) (“Form was 
disregarded for substance and emphasis was placed upon economic reality.”). 
 237. See Brief of Petitioner at 12, Howey, 328 U.S. 293 (No. 843), 1946 WL 50582 (“[T]he 
substance controls the form . . . .”); see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondent at 16 n.20, Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (No. 74-157) (“Thus, Howey cannot be read to 
require a literal monetary ‘profit’ . . . .”). 
 238. See Forman, 421 U.S. at 863–64 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the Court must 
surprise knowledgeable economists with its proposition . . . that profits cannot assume forms 
other than appreciation of capital or participation in earnings,” adding that “[n]ot only would 
simple common sense teach that [money saved and money earned] are the same, but a more 
sophisticated economic analysis also compels the conclusion that in a practical world there is no 
difference between the two forms of income.”); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral 
Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. 
L. REV. 1499, 1503 (1998) (“There is also a large body of work that suggests that whether 
decisions are ‘framed’ in terms of potential gains or losses affects decisions even though the 
framing may be completely arbitrary and manipulable.”). 
 239. See Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Law and Economics of Political Advocacy, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1218 (2008) (“‘Economic profits’ measures how profitable a company is 
relative to other ways of investing one’s money. Thus, ‘zero economic profits’ does not mean that 
firms are not making money, but rather that all firms are doing as well as the rest of the market.”); 
see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10 (6th ed. 2003) (“A profit 
opportunity is a magnet drawing resources into an activity.”). 
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purchasers of the instruments fared better than their peers who sought housing 
without purchasing the instruments in question; those who purchased the 
instruments profited. 240   In formal adjudications and other interpretive 
guidance, the SEC construed “profits” more broadly than the Forman Court; 
the Commission’s construction should have commanded the Court’s 
deference.241 
The Court attempted to respond to this line of thought, stating: “There is no 
doubt that purchasers in this housing cooperative sought to obtain a decent 
home at an attractive price.  But that type of economic interest characterizes 
every form of commercial dealing.”242  The Court was correct but presented a 
non sequitur.  The regularity with which people seek profit in a transaction 
does not speak to the presence or absence of a “security;” misplaced is any 
concern that every transaction will result in the creation of a “security.”  The 
quest for profit does not mean that one’s expectation of profit is reasonable.243  
                                                                                                                 
This Article refers to “economic profit” to suggest that the Court’s definition of profits was 
overly narrow, not to suggest its adoption by the Court.  “Economic profit” may be an overly 
narrow term in and of itself.  See, e.g., Forman v. Cmty. Servs., Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1117, 1131 
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (objecting to a definition of “profit” confined to “economic profit,” which could 
yield an inquiry into an “uncharted and unchartable realm of intangible, elusive personal values”). 
 240. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2006) (requiring the disgorgement of profits whether in the 
form of gains or losses avoided); see also Forman, 421 U.S. at 863–64 (Brennan, J., dissenting); 
Forman, 366 F. Supp. at 1129 n.36 (“[It avoids the problems of private apartment dwelling] 
where the landlord’s interest was financial gain . . . .” (first alteration in original) (quoting 
Offering Bulletin)). 
 241. See In re Abbett, Sommer & Co., Inc., 44 SEC 104, 109 (1969) (“We do not consider it 
significant that in the ‘investment contract’ cases previously cited the services were designed to 
create a profit, whereas in the present case the services were directed essentially toward 
minimizing the risk involved in the investment.”); see also Guidelines as to the Applicability of 
the Federal Securities Laws to Offers and Sales of Condominiums or Units in a Real Estate 
Development, Securities Act Release No. 5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (Jan. 18, 1973) (“The ‘profits’ 
that the purchaser is led to expect may consist of revenues received from rental of the unit . . . and 
any tax benefits resulting from rental of the unit . . . .”); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondent at 15, 16 n.20, Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (No. 74-157) (arguing that 
“[c]ontrary to petitioners’ contention that ‘profit’ in some narrow accounting sense is required” 
and concluding, “[t]hus, Howey cannot be read to require a literal monetary ‘profit’”). 
 242. Forman, 421 U.S. at 858.  The Court also referenced welfare benefits and food stamps.  
See id. at 855.  Although welfare benefits and food stamps may yield profit, consumption 
dominates investment.  The Court also tried to liken the instruments’ purchase price to a 
recoverable deposit.  See id. at 842 (stating that “[t]he sole purpose of acquiring these shares is 
to enable the purchaser to occupy an apartment in Co-op City; in effect, their purchase is a 
recoverable deposit on an apartment” and emphasizing the non-profit character of the endeavor).  
The Court, however, gave no indication that, upon a tenant’s departure, the instruments’ sales 
price would be reduced for nonpayment of rent or damage to the apartment; and neither did the 
lower courts.  The Court’s characterization of the purchase as a deposit does not reflect the 
economic realities of the transaction. 
 243. See id. at 852 (“reasonable expectations of profits” (emphasis added)). 
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Moreover, as in Forman, in any mixed-motives transaction, consumption 
frequently dominates investment.244 
The Forman Court overstated its position and need not have charted such an 
extreme course.  Having failed to defer to the Commission,245 the Court 
issued an opinion that gave rise to confusion and required clarification.  In 
subsequent cases, the Court refined, if not repudiated, its limited definition of 
“profits” set forth in Forman.246 Today, the Court’s position more closely 
resembles that of the SEC.  Had the Forman Court deferred to the 
Commission in that case, it would have alleviated the need for further 
clarification.  Given the Commission’s power to define “investment 
contract,”247 the Commission’s guidance regarding an element thereof should 
have commanded deference.248  Giving force to long-held positions of the 
Commission enhances continuity of the law and allows private actors to plan 
                                                 
 244. See id. at 864–65 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 245. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 16, Forman, 
421 U.S. 837 (No. 74-157) (“Nor does the fact that investors directly enjoy the housing to which 
their stock entitles them diminish the investment character of the transaction.”); see also id. at 15 
(“Contrary  to  petitioners’  contention  that  ‘profit’  in  some  narrow  accounting 
sense is required . . .”). 
Moreover, the Supreme Court deviated from its own precedent.  In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 
the purchasers of the disputed instruments were consumers, having acquired title to land.  328 
U.S. 293, 295 (1946) (“Upon full payment of the purchase price the land is conveyed to the 
purchaser by warranty deed.”).  The Howey Court, however, made clear that, although an 
individual could be both an investor and a consumer, one may dominate the other and in this 
instance, the investor dominated the consumer.  See id. at 299 (stating that “[t]he respondent 
companies are offering something more than fee simple interests in land”). 
 246. See SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 396 (2004) (“Concededly, Forman’s illustrative 
description  of  prior  decisions  on  ‘profits’  appears  to  have  been  mistaken  for  
an exclusive list . . . . [W]e will not bind ourselves unnecessarily to passing dictum . . . .”); see 
also Reves  v.  Ernst  &  Young,  494  U.S.  56,  58  n.4  (1990)  (“We  have,  of  
course, defined ‘profit’ . . . restrictively . . . .  To apply this restrictive definition to the 
determination whether an instrument is a ‘note’ would be to suggest that notes paying a rate of 
interest not keyed to the earnings of the enterprise are not ‘notes’ with the meaning of the 
Securities Acts.” (citing Forman, 421 U.S. at 852)). 
 247. See supra Part II.A. 
 248. Although courts should defer generally to such definitional positions advocated by the 
Commission, such deference should not be equated with blind deference.  The Commission 
supported treatment of the instruments in Forman as “securities;” and the Court was correct to 
reject the Commission’s ultimate conclusion.  Contrary to its position in Forman, the 
Commission generally treated the acquisition of a principal residence as consumption and thus 
not an “investment contract.”  See Guidelines as to the Applicability of the Federal Securities 
Laws to Offers and Sales of Condominiums or Units in a Real Estate Development, Securities 
Act Release No. 5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735, 1735 (Jan. 18, 1973) (distinguishing the acquisition of 
real estate as such from condominium units coupled with rental pool arrangements).  Under the 
Howey test, if one element is not met, then the instrument is not an “investment contract.”  See 
Gordon, supra note 44, at 396.  The Court could have deferred to the Commission’s guidance 
regarding “profits” and accorded weight to the Commission’s consistent long-standing positions, 
and still rejected any position adopted for the first time during the litigation of the case.  See 
Bressman, supra note 50, at 581. 
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their transactions in accordance with law.249  Moreover, if the SEC maintains 
its positions for long periods of time, and neither the President nor Congress 
act to countermand those positions, then the Commission’s positions command 
respect as having withstood the scrutiny of the most politically accountable 
actors.250 
2.  Rejecting the Commission’s Position Regarding “From the Efforts of 
Others” 
The Forman Court need not have continued its analysis once it concluded 
that individual purchasers were consuming, not investing, and that there could 
not be an “investment contract,” but the Court unfortunately continued its 
flawed analysis.  The Court reiterated that, in an investment contract, profit 
must flow “solely from the efforts of others,”251 despite reticence by the 
Commission and the lower courts to strictly apply the “solely” requirement,252 
and despite the fact that the “solely” requirement was dictum.253  Moreover, 
the “solely” requirement emphasized form over substance because of the ease 
with which one could circumvent the requirement.  Such emphasis on form 
over substance is inconsistent with the Court’s instruction to focus on the 
economic realities of the transaction.254  To its credit, the Court included a 
footnote and referenced the SEC’s reticence, perhaps suggesting that, in the 
future, it too would relax its position regarding the “solely” requirement.255  
Nevertheless, “Forman’s mixed signals on ‘solely’ confused rather than 
clarified the issue . . . .”256 
Accordingly, the Court revisited the matter in Landreth Timber Co. v. 
Landreth.  Although the Landreth Court addressed a congressionally 
enumerated instrument (“stock”) rather than the “investment contract” 
addressed by the Forman Court, the Court relaxed its earlier view on the 
                                                 
 249. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 
58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1489 (2005). 
 250. See Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 383 (1987) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“What goes along with the jurisdiction is the responsibility . . . .”); see 
also Bressman, supra note 50, at 555 (“Congress also likely delegates under conditions that 
minimize princip[al]-agent concerns. . . . [Congress] can rely on a position that the agency has 
long maintained in the past . . . .”). 
 251. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (citing SEC v. W.J. 
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946)). 
 252. See Guidelines as to the Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to Offers and Sales 
of Condominiums or Units in a Real Estate Development, 38 Fed. Reg. at 1735 (“Recent 
interpretations have indicated that the expected return need not be solely from the efforts of 
others, as the holding in Howey appears to indicate.  For this reason, an investment contract may 
be present in situations where an investor is not wholly inactive, but even participates to a limited 
degree in the operations of the business.” (footnote omitted)). 
 253. See LOSS ET AL., supra note 32, at 998 (discussing the Howey decision). 
 254. See id. at 950. 
 255. See Forman, 421 U.S. at 852 n.16. 
 256. COX ET AL., supra note 227, at 41. 
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“solely” requirement.257  In so doing, the Court’s position now resembles the 
SEC’s longstanding position.258 
Because the Forman Court was unwilling to reconsider its articulation of the 
“solely” requirement, it was determined to conclude that any economic gain 
enjoyed by the purchasers was not attributable to the efforts of others.259  The 
reduced rent, which the Commission believed amounted to “profit” and to 
which the Court did not defer, was directly attributable to the subsidies 
obtained through the efforts of those working for the issuer. 260   The 
individuals who purchased the instruments did nothing to obtain the subsidies 
and, based upon the Commission’s long-standing position, it is the purchaser’s 
own efforts that defeat classifying an instrument as an “investment contract,” 
and thus a “security.”261 
                                                 
 257. See  Landreth  Timber  Co.  v.  Landreth,  471  U.S.  681,  692  (1985)  
(“We cannot agree . . . that the Acts were intended to cover only ‘passive investors’ . . . .”); see 
also LOSS ET AL., supra note 32, at 956–57. 
 258. See Guidelines as to the Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to Offers and Sales 
of Condominiums or Units in a Real Estate Development, Securities Act Release No. 5347, 38 
Fed.  Reg.  1735,  1735  (Jan.  18,  1973)  (“[S]ubstance  should  not  be  
disregarded for form . . . . Recent interpretations have indicated that the expected return need not 
be solely from the efforts of others, as the holding in Howey appears to indicate.”); see also SEC 
v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 481–82 (9th Cir. 1973); Multi-Level 
Distributorships and Pyramid Sales Plans, Securities Act Release No. 5211, 36 Fed. Reg. 23,289, 
23,290 (Dec. 8, 1971) (“[I]n the Commission’s view a failure to consider the kind and degree of 
efforts required of the investors ignores  the  equally  significant  teachings  of  Howey  
that  form  is  to  be  disregarded for substance . . . . The ‘efforts of others’ referred to in 
Howey are limited, therefore, to those types of essential managerial efforts but for which the 
anticipated return could not be produced.”). 
 259. Forman, 421 U.S. at 855 (“The low rent . . . does [not] result from the managerial 
efforts of others.”). 
 260. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 4 n.5, Forman, 
421 U.S. 837 (No. 74-157) (“[A] limited profit housing company . . . is entitled to borrow up to 
95 percent of the cost of a housing project at low interest from the state or a municipality.”).  
Interestingly, then Solicitor General Robert Bork, Associate General Counsel for the SEC Paul 
Gonson, and Assistant to the Solicitor General Robert Reich contributed to the government’s 
brief.  See id. at 24. 
 261. See Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d at 482 (accepting the Commission’s 
position and holding that the instrument constituted a “security” even though the investor must 
exert some effort to realize a return on the investment, because the efforts made other than by the 
investor were undeniably the essential managerial efforts); see also Multi-Level Distributorships 
and Pyramid Sales Plans, 36 Fed. Reg. at 23,390 (“[I]n the Commission’s view a security is 
offered or sold where the franchisee is not required to make significant efforts in the operation of 
the franchise in order to obtain the promised return.”); LOSS ET AL., supra note 32, at 950 (“A 
more appropriate standard would require proof only that the efforts made by those other than the 
investor are the undeniably significant ones . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Although not addressed by the Forman Court, the timing of the promoter’s entrepreneurial 
efforts relative to the time of the purchase of the instruments may be critical.  See COX ET AL., 
supra note 227, at 43–45.  If the efforts that lead to profits were expended in advance of the 
purchase of the instruments, then the instrument may not be a “security.”  See SEC v. Life 
Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 545–48 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (distinguishing between pre- and 
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Further, in interpreting the phrase “solely the efforts of others,” the SEC 
advocated a position vastly different than the Court’s conclusion.262  Giving 
force to long-held positions of the Commission enhances continuity of the law 
and the political accountability with respect to those positions.263 
B.  Reves v. Ernst & Young 
In Reves v. Ernst & Young, the Court, without mentioning Chevron, set forth 
the inquiry for whether an instrument constitutes a “note,” thus qualifying as a 
“security.” 264   In Forman, the Court had suggested that its test for 
“investment contracts” “embodies the essential attributes that run through all 
of the Court’s decisions defining a security.”265  The Reves Court, however, 
admitted to overstating its position.  In Reves, the Court indicated that, to 
interpret the test for “investment contracts” as the ultimate test for “security,” 
would render as surplusage the other twenty-plus congressionally enumerated 
terms in the statutory definition of “security.”266  The Court concluded that a 
different test was appropriate to determine whether an instrument was a 
“note.”267 
At the time Reves was decided, different tests were percolating in the lower 
courts.  The Reves Court discussed those tests and anointed its preference, the 
                                                                                                                 
post-purchase entrepreneurial efforts by the promoter).  In Forman, the entrepreneurial efforts 
that yielded the profits sought by the purchasers were seemingly expended in advance of the 
purchase of the instruments, which could prevent treatment of the instruments as “investment 
contracts.”  The Forman Court, however, did not discuss or foreshadow this issue and, contrary 
to the conclusions of the Forman Court, the benefits enjoyed by the purchasers of the instruments 
were attributable to the efforts of others. 
 262. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 4 n.5, Forman, 
421 U.S. 837 (No. 74-157) (“[A] limited profit housing company . . . is entitled to borrow up to 
95 percent of the cost of a housing project at low interest from the state or a municipality.”); see 
also id. at 10 (captioning the issue, without reference to “solely,” as whether the individuals 
“entrusted their capital to the management of others”). 
 263. See Bressman, supra note 50, at 555 (“[Congress] can rely on a position that the agency 
has long maintained in the past . . . .”); see also Bressman, supra note 249, at 1489. 
 264. See  15  U.S.C.  §§  77b(a)(1),  78c(a)(10) (2006)  (“The  term  ‘security’  
means any note . . . .”).  This Article does not address the Court’s analysis of the proviso to 
section 3(a)(10).  15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (“The term ‘security’ . . . shall not include . . . any note 
. . . which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months . . . .”).  Though 
one may be sympathetic to the arguments of Justice Stevens, arguably, if the Court had applied 
Chevron, the clear language of the proviso might yield a disposition of the case at Chevron’s Step 
One,  rendering  the  SEC’s  interpretation  of  the  proviso  as  irrelevant.   See 
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 73–76 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 265. Forman, 421 U.S. at  852 (“This [Howey] test, in shorthand form, embodies the 
essential attributes that run through all of the Court’s decisions defining a security.”). 
 266. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 64; see also Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 691 
(1985) (“[W]e would note that the Howey economic reality test was designed to determine 
whether a particular instrument is an ‘investment contract,’ not whether it fits within any of the 
examples listed in the statutory definition of ‘security.’”). 
 267. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 64. 
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so-called “family resemblance test.” 268   The Court rejected the SEC’s 
suggestion that no one test should be adopted because the disputed instrument 
satisfied the various tests under discussion.269  Instead of following the SEC’s 
guidance,270 the Court unnecessarily addressed the issue before it was ripe.  
Additional percolation of the various tests in the lower courts would have been 
advantageous.271 
The Court’s handling of the matter worsened.  Finding that the anointed 
test provided inadequate guidance—hence the benefit of additional 
percolation—the Court took it upon itself to provide that guidance.272  After 
rejecting the test for “investment contracts” as applicable to “notes,” the Court 
set forth criteria for determining whether an instrument is a “note” that 
virtually mirror the criteria for determining whether an instrument is an 
“investment contract.”   
 
                                                 
 268. See id. at 64–65 (“Because we think the ‘family resemblance’ test provides a more 
promising framework for analysis, . . . we adopt it.”); see also Gordon, supra note 44, at 391 
(“That’s merely a conclusion. That statement is the equivalent of saying that the Court likes the 
test better.  Moreover, the family resemblance test is not an analytical test at all.  It’s a ‘smell’ 
test.”). 
 269. See Brief for the United States et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari at 8, Reves, 494 U.S. 56 (No. 88-1480), 1988 WL 1025770 (“[T]his case may not be an 
ideal vehicle for this Court’s review, since in our view the Co-Op’s notes qualify as securities 
under any of the several tests used for determining whether a note qualifies as a security.”).  
Compare Brief for the United States et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra at 15  
(“The different approaches developed by the courts of appeals for determining whether an 
instrument is a ‘note’ obviously overlap to a significant degree.  We do no doubt that those 
approaches would produce similar results in many cases.”), and id. at 24 n.26 (“Should the Court 
be disinclined to adopt the Second Circuit’s family resemblance test, the Court should 
nonetheless hold that the Co-Op’s notes qualify as securities under either the 
commercial-investment approach or the risk capital test used by the other courts of appeals.”); 
and id. at 16 n.15 (referencing that the issue of the appropriate test was not squarely presented in 
the lower courts), with id. at 16 (“Yet even though the approaches reflect a ‘common core,’ we 
believe that the Second Circuit’s family resemblance approach is . . . superior to [the other tests].  
We consequently urge [its adoption].”).  Although the Commission ultimately favored adoption 
of the Second Circuit’s family resemblance test over the alternatives and although the Court 
should defer to the Commission’s position as to which test to adopt, the Court need not have 
decided the issue, and the Court need not have deferred to the Commission’s preference that the 
Court decide the issue.  The Commission was free to craft its own definition of “note.”  Given 
the facts, the Court should not have filled the void left by the Commission. 
 270. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 778 (1996) 
(Souter, J., concurring) (“[W]e know too little to risk the finality of precision . . . .”); see also 
Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7–8 (1996) 
(highlighting “constructive uses of silence[:] . . . democracy-forcing” and minimalism “when the 
Court is dealing with an issue of high complexity”). 
 271. See LOSS ET AL., supra note 32, at 871–72 (“While the courts showed considerable 
facility in adumbrating the criteria to be considered in distinguishing commercial from investment 
notes, they were considerably less successful in theorizing how these criteria might be ordered or 
weighted.”). 
 272. Reves, 494 U.S. at 65, 67. 
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HOWEY REVES273 
 
1.  An investment of money 
 
1.  The motives are investment, not 
commercial or consumer. 
 
2.  In a common enterprise 
(under the multiple-investor 
test) 
 
2. The notes are offered and sold 
to a broad segment of the 
public. 
 
 
3.  With an expectation of 
profits 
 
3.  The public reasonably expects 
the notes to be investments. 
 
4.  Solely from the efforts of 
others. 
 
 
4.  [This is inherent in notes.] 
 
5.  The absence of an 
alternative regulatory 
scheme. 
 
 
5.  The absence of an alternative 
regulatory scheme or other 
risk-reducing factor. 
 
Additionally, in identifying the criteria that suggest the existence of a “note,” 
the Court repeatedly and confusingly cited “investment contract” precedent 
instead of precedent that addressed the existence of a “note.”274 
Recently, in SEC v. Edwards, the Court determined whether an instrument 
constituted an “investment contract,”275 and the Court’s analysis has since 
been labeled “casual.”276 
                                                 
 273. Gordon, supra note 44, at 403. 
 274. See, e.g., Reves, 494 U.S. at 66–67 (citing United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 
U.S. 837, 851 (1975)) (addressing the existence of an “investment contract,” not a “note”); 
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 687, 693 (1985) (same); Marine Bank v. 
Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 557–59 (1982) (same); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 
353 (1943) (same); see also Gordon, supra note 44, at 403–04. 
 275. See SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 393–97 (2004) (holding “that an investment scheme 
promising a fixed rate of return can be an ‘investment contract’ and thus a ‘security’ subject to the 
federal securities laws”). 
 276. LOSS ET AL., supra note 32, at 947. 
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[T]he Court could have avoided potential confusion by explaining 
how the investment contract in Edwards can be distinguished from a 
note.  Presumably, the casualness of the analysis will invite new 
applications of the . . . investment contract test to precisely the type 
of cases to which Reves said such test should not apply.277 
A future Court undoubtedly will have to resolve the confusion stemming 
from the Reves decision, which could have been avoided altogether by 
exhibiting deference to the SEC. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Despite its best efforts, Congress inevitably enacts ambiguous statutes.  In 
resolving those ambiguities, courts routinely accord deference to an 
administering agency when its position is well reasoned, consistently applied, 
and longstanding.  Courts should similarly accord deference to such positions 
advocated by the SEC, even if the ambiguity concerns the definition of 
“security.”  Generalized arguments against such court deference prove 
unavailing, and statutory clues counsel in favor of such deference to the 
Commission.  Deference to the SEC regarding the definition of “security” 
would enhance continuity of the law and political accountability. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 277. Id. at 949. 
